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RETIREMENT AND WORKER CHOICE:
INCENTIVES TO RETIRE AND THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACTt
Judith A. McMorrow*
Most persons, whether corporate executives, factory workers, or law professors, are
part of a complex work structure in which they have the status of "employee." During
their term of employment, most employees work either directly or indirectly toward the
goal of eventual independence from the work relationship through retirement. As the
values attached to the role of work in a person's life change, many employees seek to
achieve the goal of retirement before the traditional retirement age of 65. Other persons
hope to prolong retirement to well beyond the age of 65. Employers also face a complex
and rapidly changing world of shifting demographics, new technology requiring fewer
specialized skilled workers, and wage structures that may pay new workers less than
long-term workers. These changes may encourage employers to sever the employment
relationship with older workers, largely through various early retirement programs.
Retirement, however, takes place against a backdrop of statutory law that prohibits
discrimination on the basis of age. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA
or Act)1 protects employees age 40 or older and makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any person with regard to that individual's terms or conditions of
employment because of age.2 Because retirement is usually triggered by reaching a
t Copyright Q 1988 by Boston College Law Review.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I would like to thank Denis Brion,
Mark Brodin, James Holzhauer, James Repetti, Robert Smith, and Paul Tremblay for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Mary Deck, Judith Fitzgerald,
and Martha Zackin for their invaluable research assistance, and Boston College for providing a
research grant.
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) as amended by Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-592, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 3342 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 63 1(a)). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of age in the hiring, promotion, and discharge of employees between the ages of 40 and 65. 29
U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (1976) (amended 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986). In 1978, Congress amended the
ADEA expressly to prohibit involuntary retirement. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982)). The 1978 Amendments also raised the ADEA's upper age limit from
65 to 70. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 12,
92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982)). In October 1986 Congress
eliminated the upper cap under the ADEA. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3342 (to be codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)).
The Act exempts high level executives over the age of 65 who will receive more than $44,000
in nonforfeitable annual retirement benefits. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
2 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)(1) (1982).
During the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, age was considered as one form of
employment discrimination to be included under Title VII. See Freed & Dowell, The Age of Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967, 6 CLEARINGHOuSE REv. 196, 196 (1972). In lieu of incorporating
age into Tide VII, § 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 directs the Secretary of Labor to "make a
full and complete study of the factors which might tend to result in discrimination in employment
because of age and of the consequences of such discrimination on the economy and individuals
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specified age, retirement distinguishes among employees because of age. Under the
ADEA's broad prohibition against discrimination, most retirement plans would be au-
tomatically suspect under the Act because they exclude some employees over 40.
To balance the prohibition against discrimination with retirement, the ADEA ex-
pressly addresses two issues involving retirement. Section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA permits
employers to offer "bona fide" retirement plans so long as they are "not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of" the Act.3 Section 4(f)(2) also expressly provides, however, that
no plan can require the involuntary retirement of employees. 4 Between these two pos-
sibilities - passive adherence to a bona fide retirement plan and involuntary retirement
- lies a wide range of employer conduct that the ADEA does not expressly address.
The ADEA fails to clarify when, if ever, an employer's actions to encourage retirement
will constitute age discrimination.
This Article develops an analysis based upon the fundamental legislative purpose
underlying the ADEA: Congress enacted the ADEA to increase the range of choices
available to older employees. In light of the Act's language, structure, and legislative
history, as well as the current social context of retirement, it is evident that Congress
enacted the ADEA not just to eliminate arbitrary age discrimination against older work-
ers, but also to protect older employees' distinct expectations in leaving the job market
through retirement. 5 Congress also was aware that through sophisticated techniques
employers can transform an option to retire into a command to retire.6 Consistent with
the Act's goals, courts should interpret the ADEA to allow employers to enlarge the
choices available to employees but should prohibit employers from acting in ways that
make the choice illusory or structuring benefits in a manner that acts as a subterfuge
for age discrimination.
The tension between retirement and age discrimination is best exemplified by em-
ployers' increasing use of special retirement incentives?' Such incentives offer more than
affected." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (1964). The Act directed
the Secretary to make a report, including "such recommendations for legislation to prevent arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age . Id. The secretary presented the Study to
Congress on June 30, 1965. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965).
Based in part on the Secretary of Labor's finding of wide-spread discrimination, Congress enacted
the ADEA. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2213, 2214. [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 805) The ADEA, as the end product of swift
congressional action, represents a legislative compromise: the substantive proscriptions of the ADEA
parallel Title VII while the procedural requisites incorporate the Fair Labor Standards Act, Com-
pare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982) (ADEA prohibitions) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII prohib-
itions); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (states that the ADEA shall be enforced in accordance with the "powers,
remedies, and procedures" of fair labor standards). See also H.R. REP. No. 805, supra, at 2214-15;
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (December 15,
1967) (President Johnson recommended ADEA on January 23, 1967; Congress considered and
passed the Act in December 1967).
- 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
4 Id.
5 As discussed extensively in Section III of this Article, not all options that enhance choice are
lawful under the ADEA.
6 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982) (plans must be "bona fide" and "not a subterfuge").
7 A SURVEY OF RETIREMENT, THRIFT AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS COVERING SALARIED EMPLOYEES
AT 50 LARGE U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES AS OF JANUARY 1, 1987, 9 (Wyatt Co. 1987) (of the fifty
largest U.S. industrial companies, sixteen offered special early retirement incentives in 1986; thirty
[Vol. 29:347
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the terms of an existing pension plan in order to encourage employees to retire. For
example, a retirement incentive may for a limited period give employees otherwise
eligible to retire an additional cash bonus if they retire, or may change pension rules to
allow certain classes of employees to retire at an earlier age, or after fewer years of
service. These special incentives generally are designed to achieve a specific short-term
management goal, such as an immediate reduction in the workforce. Consequently, such
offers are generally available for only a short period of time, usually thirty to ninety
days,8 and are often targeted to specific groups of employees. 9 In addition, when a
business slump has motivated the retirement incentive program, older employees face
the same uncertain future that all employees face: they may be subject to ajob eliminatiorv
program. Unlike most pension plans, employees do not have the benefit of knowing that,
a retirement incentive turned down today will be available at some later date. In addition,
unlike regular pension plans, such special incentives are generally not the result of
management-labor discussions but are a purely management motivated decision.10
These special retirement incentives have spawned several lawsuits in which courts
have attempted to articulate the line between permissible and impermissible encourage-
ment to retire under the ADEA." Employees have sued because they were included in
an incentive plan and accepted, later arguing that their acceptance was not voluntary.
2
These "included employees" have argued that such retirement incentive plans are in-
herently suspect and consequently never can result in voluntary retirement.' 3 Alterna-
tively, they have argued that the manner of implementing the plan in particular cases
made it involuntary and therefore unlawful under the ADEA. 14 Other employees have
challenged retirement incentive plans because they were not included in the incentive
plan and wished to be. Such "excluded employees" claim that they have been deprived
companies offered early retirement incentives during the last 10 years; and fifteen companies
offered more than one retirement incentive program).8 Id. (of the thirty companies that have offered an early retirement window, twenty reported a
window or offer period of one to three months; ten companies reported a two-month offer period;
the longest window was three years, and the shortest was one day).
9 Id. (nine companies reported that the early retirement incentive was limited to employees in
specific divisions or designated work areas).
10 See, e.g., Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1987).
11 See infra notes 13, 15, and 16. See also Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 317
(7th Cir. 1988) ("The question of the proper treatment of early-retirement programs is the most
difficult question under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.").
12 See infra note 13.
Is See, e.g., Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 338, withdrawn and
substituted on rehearing, 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit recently found that offering
an incentive retirement program constitutes a prima facie ADEA violation. The panel held that
such programs are facially suspect and proper only if the employer proves under § 4(f)(2) that the
incentive plan was both bona fide and not a subterfuge to evade the ADEA. 43 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 341. The panel, however, quickly withdrew its original opinion and issued a new
opinion which found only that the plan as implemented raised a factual question as to voluntariness.
821 F.2d at 84. The Seventh Circuit, directly disapproving of the original Second Circuit panel
decision, has given judicial imprimatur to incentive retirement programs, finding them facially valid
and holding that they do not require justification under § 4(f)(2) of the ADEA. Henn v. National
Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the prima facie case under ADEA.
'4 See infra notes 154-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of plan implementation
methods which may render the plan involuntary.
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of an employment benefit because of their age in violation of the ADEA.'5 In yet a third
category of challenges, employees have sued claiming that the retirement incentives were
not sufficiently generous to the older eligible employees or were structured to financially
penalize older workers who refused the incentive. 6 In these cases the employees are not
claiming that retirement incentive plans are inherently suspect, but rather that they must
meet certain requirements in order to be free from claims of age discrimination.
The courts face a difficult task in articulating when an employer's conduct to
encourage retirement violates the ADEA. The ADEA unfortunately fails to define much
of its language and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is
charged with enforcing the ADEA,17 has been slow to clarify the Act's meaning.'8 As a
result, the courts have come to conflicting decisions concerning the proper interpretation
of the ADEA.' 9 These cases clearly demonstrate the tension between protecting employ-
ees from age discrimination, often through paternalistic but socially beneficial statutory
prohibitions, and the powerful attraction of voluntary retirement.
Once it is recognized that Congress enacted the ADEA in order to protect older
workers' range of options, the distinction between lawful and unlawful conduct becomes
clearer. Employees who are included in retirement incentive programs that equally
encourage all eligible employees have had their options enhanced. As long as the option
to retire is voluntary, these employees have not been discriminated against in violation
of the ADEA. Consequently, employees who claim discrimination solely because they are
included in an early retirement program should bear the burden of proving absence of
voluntariness in order to establish an ADEA violation.20 In contrast, employees who are
excluded because of their age have not had the benefit of enhanced choice and have not
been accorded the same terms and conditions of employment as other employees.
Similarly, employees included in incentive plans but offered less favorable terms because
of age also have not received equal treatment. Both types of employees can demonstrate
a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that age was the reason for either
exclusion or less generous benefits. If age is the basis for either exclusion or less generous
benefits, the employer can avoid ADEA liability only by demonstrating that the plan falls
within section 4(f)(2), which protects bona fide employee benefit plans that are not a
subterfuge to evade the purpose of the Act.2'
'5 See, e.g., Cipriano v. Board of Educ., N. Tonawanda, 785 F.2d 51, 58 (2d Cir. 1986) (employer
must show a "legitimate business reason" under § 4(f)(2) for excluding employees); Patterson v.
Independent School District No. 709, 742 F.2d 465, (8th Cir. 1984) (exclusion of older employee
from retirement incentive plan compatible with § 4(f)(2); no cost or business justification required).
See also Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs excluded from incentive
retirement plan because of their work locations, not age).
16 See, e.g., Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988); Dorsch v. L.B.
Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986); Britt v. El DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 768 F.2d
593 (4th Cir. 1985).
17 Originally, Congress gave responsibility for enforcing the ADEA to the Department of Labor.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 6-7, 81 Stat. 602, 604-05
(1967). In 1979 Congress transferred these responsibilities to the EEOC. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978,
§ 92 Stat. 3781, 3781 (1978) codified at 5 U.S.C. app., § 1155 (1982).
'8 See infra note 233.
1 See supra notes 13 and 19.
20 See infra notes 149-53.
21 Readers familiar with both the ADEA and mandatory retirement under the ADEA may wish
to begin reading at I.C., infra at note 60.
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Section I of this Article examines the ADEA's language 2 and legislative historyS
concerning retirement and demonstrates that Congress intended to structure the ADEA
to enhance employees' choices. Section II examines the use of retirement incentives and,
in light of the role of retirement in the lives of American workers24 and the benefits that
can flow from voluntary retirement, demonstrates why such incentives should not be
presumptively unlawful.25 Finally, Section III contrasts ADEA claims raised by included
and excluded employees, and demonstrates how courts can use the doctrine of construc-
tive discharge and section 4(f)(2)'s exceptions to strike the proper balance between the
interests of employers and employees.
26
I. THE STATUTE'S LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIvE HISTORY
A. The Language
The ADEA's stated goals are "to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment;
[and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment."27 The Act's first goal, which requires treatment based
on ability, describes a policy of age blindness. The second goal, prohibiting arbitrary age
discrimination, and the third goal, helping employers and workers find ways to meet
problems arising from the impact of age on employment, however, indicate that Congress
acknowledges the distinctions that arise among workers because of age.28 Unfortunately,
the ADEA fails to articulate precisely what constitutes "discrimination" or "arbitrary"
discrimination, or what "problems" exist because of the impact of age on employment. 29
The ADEA's prohibitions begin to clarify these legislative goals. The Act's express
prohibitions are designed to implement the first two purposes: to ensure that older
employees are judged on ability, and to prohibit "arbitrary age discrimination." The
ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's age."30 The Act also makes it unlawful for an employer "to limit, segregate, or
classify his [or her] employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
22 See infra notes 27-52 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 53-92 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 94-139 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 140-86 and accompanying text.
27 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
28 See Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HAsv. L. REv.
10 (1987) (describing how unstated assumptions about whose point of view will be the point of
reference allow for appearance of objectivity; points out some judicial efforts to recognize and
appreciate a perspective not that of the decisionmaker).
2 Although Title VII has a lengthy definition section, it also fails to define "discrimination."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982); see Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under
Title VII, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 769, 774-95 (1987) (discussing definition of "discrimination" under
Title VII). The ADEA's broad prohibition of "arbitrary age discrimination" presumably would
outlaw any age distinctions used for any purposes, except where the conduct was deemed "not
arbitrary."
so 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).
March 1988]
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individual of employment opportunities ... because of such individual's age."3' The
conduct prohibited by the ADEA is, in essence, a definition of discrimination.
Congress also articulated what constitutes "arbitrary age discrimination" by the
manner in which it structured the class of employees the ADEA protects and through
exceptions to the Act. Congress designated persons between the ages of 40 and 65 (with
the upper cap later raised to 70 and eliminated altogether in 1986) as the protected
class, rather than impose a general prohibition of age discrimination for all ages. 2 The
legislative history demonstrates that Congress was well aware that by limiting the pro-
tected class the ADEA did not outlaw some very obvious age-discriminatory practices,
such as mandatory retirement of stewardesses who reached the age of 32.1s
By defining the protected class as employees between the ages of 40 and 65, Congress
was obviously unwilling to prohibit all age-based restrictions in employment. The reason
is self-evident. Age is a common and pervasive criterion for eligibility for benefits and
burdens that accrue in our society. The right to work,34 drink,3 5 vote,36 and the right or
obligation to serve in the armed forces37 are all triggered by reaching a certain age.
Certain social security and welfare benefits flow directly because of the recipient's young
age.3 8 Similarly, many benefits are triggered by advanced age, the most obvious being
Social Security.3 9 In addition, over one hundred other federal programs and an unde-
termined number of state and local programs provide direct benefits to the elderly.40
Many of these age-based benefits are tied to employment, such as the minimum
work age and social security eligibility. These statutes recognize that age distinctions are
not always arbitrary because the needs of individuals may vary according to their age.4'
Although many such classifications may be based on stereotypes, Congress was unwilling
to state that all age-based restrictions in employment are improper.42
31 Id. § 623(a)(2). The ADEA also prohibits discrimination by employment agencies and labor
unions. Id. § 623(b)-(c) (1982).
32 See supra note 1 for discussion of the various amendments that raised the age of individuals
protected under ADEA.
33 See H.R. REP. No. 805, supra note 2, at 2219.
4 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 212, 213(c) (1982) (child labor laws).
35 See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. III 1985) (withholding federal highway funds from states
that allow individuals under twenty-one years of age to purchase alcoholic beverages).
3 6 U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The rights of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of age.").
37 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 519 (1982) (allowing temporary enlistment in war time of individuals at
least eighteen years of age).
38 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 607, 672 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (providing benefits and foster care
to dependent children of unemployed parents).
-9 See id. § 402 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
40 Pepper, Foreward, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 1099, 1099 (1981). Many local governments provide
discounts for public transportation, food, and other benefits to the elderly. See, e.g., MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 161A, § 5 (West 1976) (Transportation Authority shall charge persons aged 65 and
older half the regular adult cash fare); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 15 § I (West 1981) (school
committee may extend the school lunch period in order to serve lunch to authorized elderly persons
aged 65 and older).
41 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (upholding constitutionality of statute
prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting a sexual performance of a child under the age of
16) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (recognizing that a
state has a compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological interests of minors)).
42 See H.R. REP. No. 805, supra note 2, at 2219. For example, the House Report notes that
[Vol. 29:347
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By defining the protected class as those employees between the ages of 40 and 65,43
Congress identified the employees it deemed most subject to arbitrary age discrimination
and who suffered the most serious consequences. 44 By protecting only these employees,
Congress also recognized that the ADEA is directed primarily at the employment prob-
lems of older workers. 45 Unfairness imposed in the name of age discrimination against
those in the unprotected group, such as mandatory retirement for stewardesses at the
age of 32 or allowing age discrimination after 65, was tolerated in the initial drafting of
the ADEA because of the complexity of problems that a global prohibition might raise.46
Through subsequent amendments to the ADEA Congress eventually lifted the upper
age cap.4 7 The protected class is now defined as employees over the age of 40.48
some industries, such as railroads, have a disproportionately high number of older workers and
that the ADEA is not intended "to prevent an employer from achieving a reasonable age balance
in his [or her] employment structure" Id. It is difficult to reconcile this language with the ADEA's
express prohibitions. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982). In any event, that must be left to another article.
See also H.R.REP. No. 805, supra note 2, at 2220 ("[t]oo many different types of situations in
employment occur for the strict application of general prohibitions and provisions").
For a comprehensive examination of age discrimination against adults, see 1-3 H. EGLrr, AGE
DisCIMINATION (1987). As Professor Eglit notes, although age distinctions are common in our
society, they are not necessarily appropriate in all circumstances. Id. at § 1.01. The House Report
accompanying the 1967 Act states that the bill's purpose is "to promote the employment of older
workers based on their ability." This will be achieved by assisting "employers and employees in
meeting employment problems which are real and dispelling those which are illusory ...." H.R.
RE. No. 805, supra note 2, at 2214.
43 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976) (amended 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986). Because growing old is a process,
defining "age" is extremely difficult. SeeJ. LEvIN & W. LEvIN, Ageism: Prejudice and Discrimination
Against the Elderly 71 (1980) ("A person is old in our society when he or she is defined as such by
the dominant forces in society."). Congress necessarily had to define the protected class, short of
stating that age would always be an improper basis for allocating work benefits. To "define" the
protected class could require either designating both an upper and lower limit, as Congress initially
did in 1967, or to set only an upper or only a lower limit. In 1986, Congress lifted the upper cap
in the ADEA, thereby defining the protected class as anyone over age 40. See Age Discrimination
in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWS
(100 Stat.) 3342 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)).
44 H.R. RP. No. 805, supra note 2, at 2219 (age 40 was selected because "testimony indicated
this to be the age at which age discrimination in employment becomes evident"). Age 40 was also
the lower age limit used in most state statutes. Id.
45 Id. ("Although the committee recognized the significance of the problem, it was felt a further
lowering of the age limit proscribed by the bill would lessen the primary objective; that is, the
promotion of employment opportunities for older workers.").
46 See id.
47 In the 1967 Act, Congress directed the Department of Labor to examine the possibility of
raising the ADEA's upper cap, which was done in 1978 to extend protection to workers up to age
70. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 12, 92
Stat. 189, 189 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982)). In the 1978 Act, Congress
directed the Department of Labor to examine the possibility of lifting the upper cap altogether,
which was done in 1986. Id. at § 2(a); Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3342 (to be codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (a)). The incremental protections under the ADEA provide an interesting example
of "policy creeping," a topic far beyond the scope of this Article.
48 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 1986,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3342 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)). No
similar legislative effort has been undertaken to lower the ADEA's protected age class. The appro-
priateness of defining the class in this manner is not discussed expressly in this Article.
March 1988]
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Congress also attempted to separate lawful discrimination from "arbitrary" discrim-
ination through several express exceptions to the ADEA. The Act makes clear that
employment decisions based on good cause or on reasonable factors other than age are
not prohibited, even if the employee falls within the protected class.49 The ADEA
contains two exceptions that address instances in which an employer admits that it acted
because of an employee's age, but claims that some statutory protection excuses that
discrimination. First, an employer may make age distinctions "where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ)."50 The second, and most significant, exception is
found in section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA:
(1) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization - ....
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such seniority
system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of
an individual specified by section 631(a) of this title because of the age of
such individual.5'
By including these exceptions Congress has indicated that in its view differential treat-
ment that fits these statutory exceptions is not "arbitrary."
Section 4(f)(2) is critical to the ADEA because a significant employee benefit -
retirement- is made available based on age. Under the language quoted above, it would
be arbitrary discrimination for an employer to require "involuntary" retirement but it
would not be arbitrary discrimination to observe the terms of a bona fide retirement
plan that was not a subterfuge to evade the ADEA. Through this balance of interests
section 4(f)(2) addresses, at least in part, the reality that more older, rather than younger,
employees will have both the interest and financial means to retire from the job market.
49 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1982). The ADEA provides that "[it shall not be unlawful" for an
employer to "discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause." Id. See Comment,
Coming of Age: Unique and Independent Treatment of the ADEA, 7 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 583, 585-86
(1984) (ADEA provides a good cause exception, unlike Title VII). The ADEA also provides that it
shall not be unlawful to take employment action "where the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age" (RFOA). 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982). The "good cause" and RFOA pro-
visions often are used interchangeably as defenses. See Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d
974, 985 (9th Cir. 1981); Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1978);
Lake, Substantive Requirements Under the ADEA, in ADEA: A SYMPosIUM HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS
AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 28,50 (1983). Courts have disagreed about whether these exceptions
are pure affirmative defenses or whether they should be treated as part of the plaintiff's burden
of proof by shifting the burden of persuasion back to the plaintiff after the defendant has articulated
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's
Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U.L. REv. 155,
159-60 (1986); Marshall, 576 F.2d at 591. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1624.7(b) (1987).
50 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The employer usually concedes that age
was a factor in the employment decision, but argues that it was a necessary factor because of the
absence of effective alternative methods to achieve legitimate goals. See, e.g., Western Air Lines,
Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir.
1981); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1975); Lake, supra note 49, at 37-44 (1983).
5129 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). See infra § 1.B. for a discussion of the history
of § 4(f)(2).
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The language quoted above, however, did not appear in that form in the original ADEA
passed in 1967. The legislative history of the later changes in section 4(f)(2) helps clarify
the meaning of arbitrary age discrimination when retirement is involved. 52
B. The Legislative History and Mandatory Retirement
The ADEA has not always expressly prohibited mandatory retirement. When the
ADEA became law in 1967, section 4(f)(2) did not contain the caveat that no plan "shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement of an individual."' 3 The ambiguity and
apparent breadth of the original section 4(f)(2), along with the caveat that it does not
apply to hiring, caused some courts to conclude that if Congress had intended to prohibit
mandatory retirement, it would have said so expressly in section 4(f)(2).m Under this
interpretation, employers lawfully could force older employees to retire without regard
to whether the individual employee wished to remain employed and without regard to
an employee's ability to perform his or her job.
Because lower courts reached divergent interpretations55 the United States Supreme
Court considered the issue in United Airlines v. McMann.56 In McMann, the Supreme
Court held that mandatory retirement within the protected class was permitted under
section 4(f)(2), at least if such retirement occurred pursuant to a plan that was established
before the ADEA's passage.57 McMann's effect was short-lived because Congress was
simultaneously considering, and subsequently passed, legislation to prohibit expressly
involuntary retirement because of age.58
52 For more background on the ADEA see H. EGLIT, supra note 42; Sholl & Strang, Age
Discrimination and the Modem Reduction in Force, 69 MAR. L. Rav. 331 (1986).
55 As originally enacted, § 4(f)(2) read as follows:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall
excuse the failure to hire any individual.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976) (amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978)). Employees not covered by a pension or
retirement plan were not covered by § 4(f)(2) and consequently could not be forced to retire. See,
e.g., Cowlishaw v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 450 F. Supp. 148, 153-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
5 See, e.g., Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 910 (3d Cir. 1977) (mandatory retirement not a
violation of the ADEA); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
55 Compare, e.g., Zinger, 549 F.2d at 910 (mandatory retirement not an ADEA violation) and
Brennan, 500 F.2d at 215 (same) wuith McMann v. United Airlines Inc., 524 F.2d 217, 220-21 (4th
Cir. 1976) (mandatory retirement violated § 4(f)(2)), rev'd, 434 U.S. 192, 195 (1977) (no violation).
56 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
5 Id. at 196.
5s McMann was decided on December 12, 1977, 434 U.S. at 192. At that time both the House
and Senate had passed amendments to the ADEA. See 123 Cong. Rec. 9984-9985; id. at 17303.
The Senate Report accompanying the 1978 Amendments, written before the Supreme Court's
decision in McMann, expressed "congressional approval of the result reached by the fourth circuit
in McMann." S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 504, 513. The House Conference Report, written after the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in McMann, stated that the "conferees specially disagree with the Supreme Court's holding
and reasoning in that case. Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of enactment are not exempt
under section 4(f)(2) by virtue of the fact that they antedate the act or these amendments." H.R.
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The 1978 Amendments to the ADEA59 resolved any ambiguities in section 4(f)(2)'s
language and essentially overruled McMann by making clear that a seniority or benefit
plan may not require or permit involuntary retirement. 6° These 1978 Amendments
restored balance to the ADEA by continuing to permit retirement plans, but not allowing
retirement plans to circumscribe directly the employee's choice of whether to work. The
legislative history of the 1978 amendments focused on the evils of "forced" and "invol-
untary" retirement. 6' The legislative report accompanying the amendments emphasized
two primary problems concerning mandatory retirement. First, the report found that
"chronological age alone is a poor indicator of ability to perform ajob."62 There is ample
evidence that the aging process does not on average impair the work abilities of individ-
uals from 55 to 70 years of age.63 The probability of decline in work performance may
increase as the individual grows older but actual decline is much more diffuse as persons
age than is the physical maturation process in youths.64 As a result, age is significantly
less predictive as an indicator of decline than as an indicator of maturity. Second, the
report concluded that "mandatory retirement works severe injustices against the aged."65
CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 528,
529 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950].
-9 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a),
92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 523(f)(2) (1982)). The House Confer-
ence Report accompanying the Amendments stated that the purpose of the § 4(f)(2) amendment
was "to make absolutely clear one of the original purposes of this provision, namely, that the
exception does not authorize an employer to require or permit involuntary retirement of an
employee within the protected age group on account of age." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, supra note
58, at 529. See also Note, Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Pension Plan Exception After
McMann and the 1978 Amendments, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 323 (1978) (discussing advisability and
impact of 1978 Amendments to ADEA).
6 0 It is not this Article's purpose to discuss whether McMann was correctly decided. The Court
of Appeals and Supreme Court decisions in McMann sparked considerable debate, but the congres-
sional action iiooted the discussion. See, e.g., Comment, The Problem of Involuntary Retirement Before
Age 65, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 1053 (1977); Doppelt & Takefman, The Retirement-Plan Exemption in the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Bona Fide Employee Benefit Plan Exception, 5 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 509 (1977); Recent Development, 66 GEO. L.J. 173 (1977). The 1978 Amendments provided a
limited grandfather clause for plans established by certain collective bargaining agreements. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-256, § 2(b), 92 Stat. 189, 189
(1978). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(d)(1)-(2) (1987). The EEOC regulations state that the new
prohibition against mandatory retirement applied to all cases pending at the date of the Amendment
or filed thereafter, regardless of whether the plaintiff involuntarily retired before or after enactment
of the amendments. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(b)(2) (1987). Most courts that have considered the issue,
however, have rejected the government's position that the prohibition against mandatory retirement
operated retroactively. See, e.g., EEOC v. Shell Oil, Co., 637 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1981); Carpenter
v. Continental Trailways, 635 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 1980); Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d
490, 497-98 (7th Cir. 1980); Jenson v. Gulf Oil Refining & Marketing Co., 623 F.2d 406, 409-13
(5th Cir. 1980); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1119-24 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Davis
v. Boy Scouts of Am., 457 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.N.J. 1978).
61 S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 513 ("forced retirement extinguishes an individual's right
to employment and thus is not excused by Section 4(f)(2) unless the retirement is based on some
reason other than age, such as disability or poor performance").
62 Id. at 505.
6 See, e.g., L. BRONTh & A. PIFER, OUR AGING SOCIETY: PARADOX AND PROMISE 61-62 (1986).
64 E. PALMORE, HANDBOOK ON THE AGED IN THE UNITED STATES xxi (1984).
65 S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 506. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-527, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.,
at 1-2 (1977).
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An individual worker may not be financially able to retire at the time his or her employer
imposes mandatory retirement.66 In addition, workers may suffer adverse physical and
psychological consequences from being forced out of the job market, particularly when
the individual's job is strongly linked with social indicators such as money, social status,
and social contacts.6 7
Eliminating mandatory retirement is grounded in the concept of individual rights.
At the time mandatory retirement developed, employment-at-will concepts were becom-
ing entrenched in the common law.68 Individual employee rights were viewed as sub-
ordinate to the employer's business or managerial decisions. A revolution has since
occurred in the concept of employee rights,6 9 and at the same time the political power
of older members of our society has increased significantly.70 It was inevitable that the
6S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 506-07. But see E. PALMORE, B. BURCHETr, G. GILLENBAUM,
L. GEORGE & L. WALLMAN, RETIREMENT: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 73-76 (1986) [hereinafter
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES] (study found no negative financial consequences resulting from man-
datory retirement; [authors posit] that those who are subject to mandatory retirement are more
likely to work for large corporations with good pension systems). When viewed as an issue of
individual rights, however, the absence of a statistically based impact does not negate the existence
of individual unfairness.
67 S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 507; A. FONER, AGING AND OLD AGE: NEW PERSPECTIVES
39 (1986). But see E. PALMORE, supra note 64, at 73-76. Congress cited the adverse consequences of
mandatory retirement in order to justify eliminating mandatory retirement. A plaintiff need not
show actual adverse consequences in order to state a cause of action under the ADEA.
r, See M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 149-51 (1981) (employment-at
will-doctrine evolved in the late nineteenth century). Mandatory retirement emerged as a common
practice with the advent of industrialized society in the late nineteenth century. Mandatory retire-
ment first appeared in certain industries in which technological advances made workers obsolete.
W. Graebner, Retirement and the Origins ofAge Discrimination, in READINGS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
oF AGING 177 (M. Minkler & C. Estes, ed. 1984). Between 1885 and 1915, for example, age limits
became common in the printing industry. Id. at 179. See alsoJ. LEVIN & W. LEVIN, Ageism: Prejudice
and Discrimination Against the Elderly 87-90 (1980). Shorter life spans may explain why mandatory
retirement was uncommon before the nineteenth century. At the same time that increased longevity,
immigration, and birth rates provided a steady supply of workers, retirement became an accepted
industry method to phase out older workers on an impersonal basis. W. Graebner, Supra, at 198.
Ironically, the Social Security Act of 1935, which was designed only to provide workers the option
to retire, spurred the industry practice of mandatory retirement both by creating employee expec-
tation of the right to retire and by encouraging employers to establish private pension plans that
paralleled Social Security provisions. W.A. ACHENBAUM, SHADES OF GRAY: OLD AGE, AMERICAN
VALUES, AND FEDERAL POLICIES SINCE 1920 101 (1983). Social Security also has been characterized
as a "subsidized segregation of the elderly" that "implicitly condoned" mandatory retirement and
devalued American elderly. J. WILLIAMSON, L. EVANS, L. POWELL, THE POLITICS OF AGING: POWER
AND POLICY 228 (1982) [hereinafter THE POLITICS OF AGING]. After World War II the number of
workers covered by private pensions increased significantly. Such plans increasingly provided for
mandatory retirement. W.A. ACHENBAUM, supra, at 198. By 1974, 41% of all employees covered by
private pension plans were subject to mandatory retirement. S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 512
(citing 1974 Bureau of Labor Statistics Study). By 1985, when the ADEA protected workers up to
age 70, 51% of workers covered by pension plans were subject to mandatory retirement at age 70.
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health and Long Term Care of the Select Committee on Aging,
99th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report on Eliminating Mandatory Retirement (Comm. Print 1986).
6M. GLENDON, supra note 68, at 143.
70 See generally THE POLITICS OF AGING, supra note 68. Older Americans effectively have been
united due to identification of common interests, such as a common interest in protecting Social
Security. See id. at 89-90. In addition, the increased use of private pension plans has resulted in
the accumulation of a large amount of capital that plan administrators invest for the purpose of
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equal employment opportunity concepts associated with face, sex, religion, and national
origin classifications would be extended to age.
The overarching principle of individual rights in American law undermines the
justification for mandatory retirement.7' For example, employers argue that mandatory
retirement obviates the need for individual determinations, which are often difficult and
more expensive for the employer than a blanket rule.72 Mandatory retirement arguably
creates job opportunities for the young, women, and minorities.7 Businesses also can
predictably plan job openings and avoid the increased pension, insurance, and salary
costs of older workers.74 In some businesses youth and corresponding physical attrac-
tiveness are highly-prized characteristics. 75 These arguable benefits of mandatory retire-
ment, however, are the same kind of benefits that employers have used to justify race
or sex discrimination.
Diffused benefits are seldom forceful arguments in support of unlimited freedom
to discriminate when weighed against equal opportunity, particularly when the discrim-
ination causes individual hardship. 6 This reasoning applies as well to justifications for
mandatory retirement that are based on concern for older employees as a group. For
example, an employer's determination that an individual employee can no longer make
it in the workforce erodes that employee's self-esteem. 77 It is arguably kinder to require
mandatory retirement for all workers over a certain age rather than individual deter-
minations that will be personally devastating for those employees who are determined
to be incompetent. This rationale for mandatory retirement, however, sacrifices the
interests of the older employees who can work for the interests of the older employees
who cannot work. Because of the societal focus on individual, rather than group, rights,
it is not surprising that this justification is also not sufficient to override the concern for
the older employee who is both competent and wishes to remain in the workforce.78
disbursing to retired workers, which in turn gives pension plans the means to lobby for favorable
tax treatment. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1987 (in 1970, private pension fund
assets were $151 million; in 1985, private pension fund assets were $1.132 billion.).
71 See J. WALKER & H. LAZER, THE END OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR MAN-
AGEMENT 12-13 (1978) (summarizes arguments for and against mandatory retirement).
72 See id. at 12.
73Id. at 13.
74 Id. But see Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 252 (1971) (employers
incur costs when they act contrary to ethical norms).
75 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (1984-85).
76 See S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 505-07. Even a small increase in participation of
persons aged 65 to 70 in the labor market will have a positive economic effect. See id. at 507
(mandatory retirement cost the nation 4.5 billion 1976 dollars). See also H.R. Doc. No. 40, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967).
77 McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Emploment Screening, 59 TEx. L. REv. 999, 1015 (1981).
78 Consistent with the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA, courts have held since 1978 that
involuntary early retirement based on an employee's age and different treatment of employees who
are eligible for early retirement both violate the ADEA. See, e.g., EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d
1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (court found that collective bargaining agreement which provided that
employees eligible for early retirement were not eligible for severance pay violated the ADEA);
EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183, 1186, rehearing en bane denied (with opinion), 738 F.2d 167
(6th Cir. 1984) (court found that employer's policy which provided that employees eligible for early
retirement were not eligible for layoff status, violated the ADEA); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1984) (some employees eligible for early retirement not eligible
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C. The Language and Legislative History and Early Retirement
The ADEA prohibits "discrimination" and states that "involuntary" retirement is
prohibited by the Act. Both "discrimination" and "involuntary" emphasize the reaction
of the employee. The language and legislative history of the Act demonstrates that the
employee's voluntariness is the pivotal concept in the ADEA's regulation of retirement.
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against" an employee
"because of such individual's age."79 This language establishes a common thread in any
ADEA discharge case. Where a termination is at issue, the phrase to "discriminate
against" necessarily implies that the employee left his or her employment because the
employer took some action based on age that disadvantaged the employee. This means
that the employer's act is wrongful if it inures to the employee's disadvantage. That
disadvantage cannot be governed by an objective standard. It would be wholly inconsis-
tent with the ADEA's goals to allow employers to claim a paternal "best interest" - that
the employee is in fact better off retired or working in some other organization even
though the employee does not recognize it. Congress obviously rejected this paternalistic
justification when it prohibited mandatory retirement.8 0 Rather, the employee can show
disadvantage by demonstrating at a minimum that the result is one that the employee
does not seek or want. In race or sex discrimination cases courts call on common
experience to acknowledge that few people desire lower wages than similarly situated
employees. 8' Common experience with retirement shows that some, but by no means
all, similarly situated older employees will want to retire voluntarily from the job mar-
for layoff benefits, held violation of the ADEA); EEOC v. County of Calumet, 686 F.2d 1249 (7th
Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Liggett & Meyers Inc., 29 FEP Cases 1611 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
Although an employer cannot force an employee to take early retirement under § 4(f)(2), the
employer can still terminate or lay off the employee. An employer can even offer an early retirement
option without violating the Act if the decision is based on a reasonable factor other than age. 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982); Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 339, 345 (D.C. Cir.) (plaintiff
may have been treated unfairly but record was devoid of evidence that age was a "determining
factor" in decision to terminate plaintiff), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); Halsell v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 291-92 (8th Cir. 1982) ("the issue is not whether the reason articulated
by the employer warranted the discharge, but whether the employer acted for a nondiscriminatory
reason"); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1982); Cline v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 487 n.7 (4th Cir. 1982); Parcinski v. Outlet Co., 673 F.2d 34, 36 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983); Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d
1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980), ("[tjhe question before the court is not whether the company's methods
were sound, or whether its dismissal of [the plaintiff] was an error of business judgment" but
"whether [the plaintiff] was discriminated against because of his age"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959
(1981). Corporate reorganizations, job eliminations, and reductions in force will occur and the
ADEA does not automatically protect workers over 40 from these adverse employment actions.
Older workers are only protected to the extent that the employer's decision concerning the indi-
vidual worker is based on the employee's age. Parcinski, 673 F.2d at 36; Smith v. Reynolds Chemical,
636 F.2d 1116, 1117 (6th Cir. 1980). An employer, however, is highly unlikely to get summary
judgment in such a case. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
79 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).80 See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
81 A call to "common experience" can be a powerful and dangerous legal argument. "Common
experience" can varying significantly due to a person's background and individual characteristics.
See Minow, supra note 28. Calling on common experience, however, is a less dangerous argument
when it supports giving individuals a range of real, not illusory, choices.
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ket.8 2 For ai employer merely to provide this desired retirement opportunity cannot
always be labeled as "discrimination against" the older employee any more than providing
employees who have had no higher education the opportunity to go to college is "dis-
crimination against" employees who will decide not to take advantage of the opportu-
nity.8 Offering benefits that not all employees will take advantage of in precisely the
same way is not automatically discrimination.
Section 4(f)(2)'s statutory exception also recognizes that voluntariness is the dividing
line between lawful and unlawful activity under retirement programs. As noted above,
Congress amended section 4(f)(2) in response to the Supreme Court's holding in
McMann that the ADEA did not prohibit mandatory retirement. Congress responded
by not just outlawing mandatory retirement, but also by prohibiting involuntary retire-
ment. The word "involuntary" focuses directly on the individual employee's freedom of
choice.84
The ADEA's legislative history is replete with evidence that a significant goal of the
Act was to protect and enhance the employee's freedom of choice.85 The Committee
Report accompanying the 1978 Amendments states that the Amendments were passed
"to protect older workers from involuntary retirement,"' 6 "to insure that older individ-
uals who desire to work will not be denied employment opportunities solely on the basis
of age,"8' 7 and to outlaw "mandatory retirement."8 Congress emphasized the autonomy
of the individual employee: "For capable older workers the retirement decision should
be an individual option. Maximum freedom of choice should be given to employees in
deciding when to retire, provided they are still physically and psychologically able to
perform their jobs in a satisfactory manner."8 9 Although the 1978 Committee Report
82 See infra notes 96-109, and accompanying text for a discussion of American workers' varying
attitudes about retirement.
83 See Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[r]etirement is
an innocuous event, coming once to many employees and more than once to some").
84 See infra notes 154-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the attributes of "invol-
untary" retirement.
85 In recommending the ADEA's passage in his Older Americans Message on January 23, 1967,
President Lyndon B. Johnson focused on the opportunities of older workers: "[h]undreds of
thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age
discrimination .... Opportunities must be opened to the many Americans over 45 who are qualified
and willing to work." 113 Cong. Rec. 34,743-44 (1967) (emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No.
805, supra note 2, at 2214.
86 S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 504.
87 Id. "A person with the ability and desire to work should not be denied that opportunity solely
because of age." Id. at 506.
88 Id. at 504.
89Id. at 506 (emphasis added). See also 132 Cong. Rec. H 8,126 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Waxman) ("[The ADEA] does provide [senior citizens] with an important
choice"); id. (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[Older Americans] have a right to be there if they can and
want to do the job."); id. at H8,127 (statement of Rep. Tauke) ("[i]f older Americans want to
continue to work and earn a living when they are past the age of 70, there would be no obstacles
barring them from doing so"); id. at H8,128 (statement of Rep. Gilman) ("and to let our senior
citizens decide for themselves whether they want to fly south for their winters"); id. at H8,130
(statement of Rep. Lehman) ("[o]ur older workers should be able to make employment decisions
for themselves, free from age discrimination requirements"); S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 506
("[flor capable older workers the retirement decision should be an individual option"); 123 Cong.
Rec. 29,007 (statement of Rep. Biaggi) ("[w]e should insure that our own elderly citizens also have
the right of self-determination with respect to employment... "); id. at 29,012 (statement of Rep.
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reflected Congress's recognition that the demographic changes to an older workforce
will place a heavy burden on Social Security, "the [conference] committee [did] not
suggest that workers should be required to continue working beyond 65," but only that
employees should not be discouraged from working longer.90 Similarly, the 1986 Amend-
ments that removed the ADEA's upper age limitation indicate no intent to interfere with
voluntary retirement decisions.9' EEOC regulations, consistent with this interpretation,
flatly state that nothing in the ADEA prohibits allowing individuals "to elect early
retirement at a specified age at their own option. '92
Grassley) ("[c]learly, to force older workers to retire simply on the basis of age is to deny them the
right to exercise their freedom fully . . . "); id. (statement of Rep. Fish) ("[i]t should be their choice
to decide to retire or to continue to work. The ... [ADEA] will provide our older working citizens
with the choice that has been denied them for so long."); id. at 34,296-98 (statement of Sen. Javits)
("what we seek to do through this act is to assure older workers the opportunity to participate, or
not participate, in the workforce in the manner they themselves choose... permitting each person
to continue working past age 65 as a matter of individual choice and ability ... [t]he heart of the
matter is personal opportunity... ").
90 S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 507. The structure of pension plans and retirement
incentives indirectly discourage employees from working longer by making retirement financially
attractive. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
91 H.R. REP. No. 756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
5628, 5633. (1986) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 756) ("would ensure that those Americans age 70
and over who desire to continue working and are able to continue performing in a competent
fashion are not denied the basic human right right to earn a living"). The ADEA's legislative history
is replete with indications that the statute's goal was to allow employees to remain productive
members of the workforce if they so wished. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 756, supra, at 5640 (Individual
view of Rep. Biaggi) (bill allows "a person to work past 70 should they want to ... "); 132 Cong.
Rec. H8,126 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman); id. at H8,126 (statement of
Rep. Smith); id. at H8,131 (statement of Rep. McCain); id. (statement of Rep. Chappell); H.R. REi.
No. 493, supra note 58, at 507; 123 Cong. Rec. 34,294 (statement of Sen. Williams). Individual
members of the House and Senate recognized that early retirement exists and many inclfded on
the record comments that nothing in the ADEA should be interpreted to prevent voluntary early
retirement. See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. H8,123 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. Martinez)
("[this bill does not change the fact that workers who choose to retire early and take advantage of
early retirement incentives provided by some employers can still do so"); id. at H8,126 (statement
of Rep. Waxman) ("[tihere is no question that many workers look forward to retirement and have
no interest in working past the age of 70"); H.R. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 510 ("very few
employees will choose to work until 70"); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,012 (statement of Rep. Pickle) ("[t]hat
is not to say that voluntary retirement should be discouraged"); id. at 30,569 (statement of Rep.
Hammerschmidt) ("[B]anning mandatory retirement would not abolish retirement. Indications are
that the actual number of employees who would opt to continue working past age 65 would probably
be quite small."); id. at 34,297 (statement of Sen. Javits) ("[T]he trend ... has been toward early
retirement .... A recent Roper poll found that nearly two-thirds of Americans would like to retire
before age 62, and over one-third prefer to retire before reaching 60."); id. at S34,300 (statement
of Sen. Cranston discussing the amendment excepting tenured professors from the ADEA's pro-
visions) ("[T]he facts are that very few professors who have the choice actually continue working.").
The 1986 ADEA amendments also prohibit employers from refusing to limit or stop accrual
of pension benefits for employers who work beyond the traditional retirement age. See Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-509, § 9201, 100 Stat. 1874, codified at § 4(i)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 623(i)(1). This amendment also broadens employees' choices by disallowing employers
from indirectly discouraging continued employment.
- 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(f) states: "Neither section 4(f)(2) nor any other provision of the Act makes
it unlawful for a plan to permit individuals to elect early retirement at a specific age at their own
option. Nor is it unlawful for a plan to require early retirement for reasons other than age." Id.
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II. INCENTIVES TO RETIRE AND PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY
As noted above, Congress intended to protect employees' voluntary retirement
options while at the same time prohibit certain employer conduct. It does not necessarily
follow that because an employee may voluntarily wish to retire early that the employer
may lawfully encourage early retirement.93 Voluntary retirement incentives, however,
are an option that can yield significant benefits to both the employer and the employee.
Consequently, employers should not be disempowered from offering retirement incen-
tives.
A. Incentives from the Employee's Perspective
Sixty-five is commonly viewed as the retirement age, probably because it is the age
at which individuals may receive Social Security benefits.M Although Congress eliminated
the ADEA's upper age limit in 1986, 65 continues to be the age at which an employee
currently can receive full benefits both under Social Security and most private pension
plans.95 As the preceding section demonstrates, the ADEA is structured to protect
employees' retirement interests. The retirement patterns of American workers demon-
strate that retiring is exactly what a large number of employees want to do.
There is a significant pattern of voluntary early retirement in the United States.90
Over 70 percent of all new Social Security awards are made to individuals who accept
reduced benefits by retiring before the age of 65.97 As a result of this trend, both
Congress and the business community recognized that prohibiting mandatory retirement
and raising the ADEA's upper age limit to 70 were unlikely to affect significantly the
composition of the workforce.98 Similarly, in 1986 Congress predicted that eliminating
93 For example, it would probably violate Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if an employer
offered all black employees $1000 to resign. Even if the employees want that option, as a matter
of public policy the courts would likely rule that offer unlawful. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 623 (1935). According to common belief,
age 65 was selected because Otto von Bismark, the first chancellor of the German empire, used age
65 in the Old Age and Survivors Pension Act. See HousE SE.ECT COMM. ON AGING, 95TH CONG.,
1ST SaSS., MANDATORY RETIREMENT: THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN COST OF ENFORCED IDLENESS (Comm.
PubI. No. 95-91, 1977); S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 525 (65 was selected "because of the use
of this age in pre-war Germany's social security system.").
95 See supra note 1 and infra notes 123-25. The ADEA's upper age limit had been lifted for
only a short period when this Article was written. There is little reason to believe that eliminating
the upper cap will alter early retirement patterns. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM
CARE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING, 9 9 TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN 6 (Comm,
Pub. No. 99-561) (1986).
96 Between June 1980 and May 1981, 76% of all male Social Security recipients and 84% of
the women opted to receive benefits before the age of 65. 48 Social Security Bulletin 22, 23 (1985).
J. WALKER & H. LAZER, supra note 71, at 8. See also Fullerson, The 1995 Labor Force: A First Look,
103 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 11, 16-17 (Dec. 1980). The trend toward early retirement has slowed in
recent years. SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, SELECT COMMITrEE ON AGING,
99TH CONG., 2D Sass., REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN 6 (Comm. Pub. No. 99-561) (1986).
97 Id.
98 S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58 at 507. ("[E]stimates by the Department of Labor indicate that
if mandatory retirement had been prohibited for all workers under 70 years of age in 1976, the
male labor force would have increased by only one-tenth to two-tenths of a percent. For the female
labor force the figure would have been one-tenth of a percent. This represents an increase in the
labor force of approximately 200,000 per year.") See also J. WALRER & H. LAZER, supra note 71, at
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the upper age limit would only marginally affect the number of older workers in the
workforce. 99
One significant factor that has enhanced the attraction of early retirement is the
changing concept of work and leisure by American workers. 100 At one time, retirement
was viewed primarily as the brief stop between terminating work-life and death. In-
creased longevity and general health for older Americans has changed the role of
retirement. For many Americans work is no longer an end in itself, but a means to allow
one to pursue leisure activities. 10' Retirement for many has become "a well-deserved and
earned release from the instrumental chores of work."'0 2 A 1981 national poll indicated
that 45 percent of the public looks forward to retiring. 05 An even higher percentage of
the public looks forward to retiring if they are likely to have sufficibnt financial means
to be self-supporting.'-
The individual employee's decision to retire early is clearly a personal decision
affected by a complex interaction of factors. 05 Studies indicate that early retirement
decisions, however, are primarily affected by the employee's attitudes toward work and
retirement, perceptions of health, and adequacy of retirement income.' 6 Although an
employer can have an impact on an employee's attitude toward work and general health,
such factors will generally yield to the employee's economic concerns 07 The most
obvious, immediate, and direct influence an employer can have on the employee's
retirement decision comes through the financial benefits the employer can provide to
the employee on his or her retirement.0 8 Consequently, for many employees the desire
to retire cannot be satisfied without the employer's cooperation. To disempower the
8 (1978) ("experience suggests that relatively few employees will wish to prolong their work careers").
The profile of the typical age discrimination plaintiff supplies inferential support for this point.
In 1981 only 5% of all ADEA charges filed with the EEOC were filed by persons aged 65-69. S.
McConnell, Age Discrimination in Employment, in POLICY IN WORK AND RETIREMENT 167 (H. Parnes,
ed. 1983).
SSUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, SELECT COMMrIrEE ON AGING, 99TH
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE CHAMRMAN 4, 6 (Comm. Pub. No. 99-561) (1986); H.R. REP. 99-
756, 99TH CONG. 2D SEss. 4 (1986) (accompanying H.R. 4154).00 See infra notes 101-07.
101 W. A. ACHENBAUM, supra note 68, at 59-61; Sonnenfeld, supra note 48, at 82.
102 W. A. ACHENBAUM, supra note 68, at 60.
103 Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., AGING IN THE EIGHTIES: AMERICA IN TRANSITION, A
STUDY FOR THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE AGING, INC. 50-51 (1981) [hereinafter AGING IN THE
EIGHTIES]..The Harris poll also revealed that 49% of the public do not look forward to retirement.
Id. Whatever view the reader associates with, it is evident that few workers are neutral on the subject-
of retirement. Most important for purposes of this discussion, a significant segment of the workforce
perceives retirement as an attractive alternative.
104Id.
05 Rones, The Retirement Decision: A Question of Opportunity?, 103 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 14, 15
(Nov. 1980).
106 W. A. ACHENBAUM, supra note 68, at 58-62; CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 66, at
35.
107 See M. GLENDON, supra note 68, at 171 (referring to factors that influence employee decisions
to change jobs: 'job satisfaction, while extremely significant, must usually yield to the employee's
perception of his [or her] economic condition").
10 Employer policies that affect all employees can have a significant impact on how much an
individual employee enjoys his or her work. The employer usually has a lesser affect on the
employee's health, except to the extent that work-related stress, exposure to hazardous conditions,
and preventive health care affect the individual's health.
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employer from offering retirement incentives inevitably circumscribes the employee's
retirement options.
The employee's ability to elect early retirement is also consistent with the concept
of individual rights embodied in the ADEA.'09 As noted above, Congress eliminated
mandatory retirement based on its concern for individual fairness; an employee should
be judged on his or her merit." 0 The prevalence of retirement, through Social Security
and private pensions, has also created the expectation of retirement."' Just as the concept
of an employee's "right" not to be forced to retire emerged as the driving force behind
eliminating mandatory retirement, so too has emerged an equally strong "right" to decide
whether to retire." 2 Thus, eliminating mandatory retirement at the same time that there
is a trend toward eai-ly retirement is no paradox. Both enhance the individual employee's
freedom of choice.
The individual worker's choice and, therefore, consent as a justification for retire-
ment incentives is not inherently an illusory or fictional consent, unlike the economic
justifications for many social transactions." l3 An individual employee's desire to retire is
often motivated by a desire to maximize personal happiness."' Many people - but not
all - want to retire in order to devote time to leisure activities." 5 Even when a worker's
decision to retire early is due to variables such as ill health, these variables are generally
independent of the employer's actions. 116
In addition, there is no reason to think that a worker cannot consider rationally
whether to retire. All employees should not be deprived of the options provided by
retirement incentive programs solely because the choice may be difficult for some em-
ployees." 7 Voluntary retirement, when not compelled by poor health, can and often
does result in positive effects, including an increase in life satisfaction." s There is, in
addition, no demonstrable decline in health due to voluntary retirement." 9 Furthermore,
109 Preserving an employee's retirement options obviously is consistent with making a wide
pattern of choices available to the worker. Employees have the right to quit anytime they wish,
absent a binding contract. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. If the individual employee is contractually
entitled to benefits through a pension plan, he or she has a judicially enforceable interest, Even
with a binding contract, however, the appropriate remedy for breach of a personal services contract
is damages, not specific performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981); 11
WILLISTON ON CONTACrS §§ 1423, 1450 (3d ed. 1968 and Supp. 1987).
"
0 See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
"I AGING IN THE EIGHTIES, supra note 103, at 50 (approximately 45% of the population looks
forward to retirement; 54% of retired individuals aged 65 and over with annual incomes of $20,000
looked forward to stopping work).
1121Id.
"s See West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions
of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HAZv. L. REv. 384, 394-95 (1985).
"4 See supra notes 101-02.
l lDId.
116 Cf Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986) (confession given because of individual's
internal compulsion still "voluntary" for Fifth Amendment purposes absent police coercion or
wrongdoing). Although the method or form of the offer may undermine the voluntariness of the
employee's choice, regulating the circumstances of the offer can eliminate the danger of coercion
or illusory consent. See infra § III of this Article.
"1 Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 1987).
18 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 66, at 77-80 (documents consequences of voluntary
retirement).
"9 Id. at 78-79.
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even if voluntary retirement provided no demonstrable benefit to older workers as a
group, there is no reason to conclude that individual older workers are unable to make
a decision, based on their personal life circumstances, about whether to retire voluntarily.
The possibility remains that by merely providing a retirement incentive, targeted to
a particular group of employees, the employer skews the employee's choice by creating
the impression that the employee is no longer wanted. The employee might then defer
to the employer's authority. 120 It would be highly inappropriate, however, for Congress
or the courts to prohibit retirement incentives carte blanche based on an undocumented
perception that the offer taints the choice. In general, workers perceive retirement as a
benefit, as evidenced by the significant number who view retirement positively and who
elect early retirement. 12' Thus, the possibility of voluntary retirement can be character-
ized accurately as an employee benefit. If some of the employees within the target group
genuinely wish to retire, to prohibit outright the special incentives would deny them a
benefit. Even if a retirement incentive inherently carries with it an element of coercion,
as discussed at length in Section III, the more appropriate response is to, regulate the
form in which the offer is made - for example, by designating that it cannot be tailored
to a single employee, and refining the definition of "voluntary" retirement. These less
restrictive alternatives protect the early retirement option for those employees who wish
to take advantage of it while preventing employers from silently coercing employees
who do not wish to retire into accepting the retirement incentive. The ADEA rejected
paternalism as a justification for mandatory retirement. 22 It follows naturally that Con-
gress similarly intended to reject paternalism as a justification for prohibiting retirement
incentives.
B. Incentives from the Employer's Perspective
A significant percentage of pension plans provide some form of early retirement at
reduced benefits if the employee so elects. 22 Not only is offering early retirement a
common practice, but additionally most such plans provide greater benefits than would
be available under an actuarial reduction based on age. 24 This indicates that manage-
120 West, supra note 113, at 400.
121 See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text for a discussion on the role of retirement.
Evidence of early retirement patterns loses its force, however, if the current early retirement pattern
is itself coerced because of age discrimination. At least from the employees' perspective, however,
no data supports this claim. A 1981 Harris poll found that a majority of American workers-said
that they left work by choice. AGING IN THE EIGHTIES, supra note 103, at 53 (62% said they left
work by choice; 37% reported that they felt "forced into retirement," but two-thirds of those who
felt forced reported that "poor health" and "disability" were the reason they were forced to retire;
poll included workers involuntarily retired under pre-19 7 8 pension plans). See also Karlen v. City
Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[n]or can it seriously be argued that the
concept of early retirement for workers over a specified age stigmatizes such workers").
12 2 See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
I2 3 See S. RHINE, MANAGING OLDER WORKERS: COMPANY POLICIES AND ATTITUDES, 4-6 (1984)
(62% of the 363 surveyed corporations offered pensions plans that contained early-retirement
inducements); A SURVEY OF RErIREMENT, THRIr AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS COVERING SALARIED
EMPLOYEES AT 50 LARGE U.S. INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES AS OFJANUARY 1, 1987, at 8 (Wyatt Co. 1987)
(in survey of the 50 largest U.S. industrial companies, all plans permitted retirement at age 60).
124 S. RHINE, supra note 123, at 5 (92% of plans that offer discount provide greater than actuarial
reduction); SURVEY, supra note 123, at 8 (of surveyed companies, all but three provided full benefits
under some circumstances at age 62).
March 1988]
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
ment not only wants to give workers the opportunity to retire, but also wants that
opportunity to be very attractive. Private pension benefits for early retirement go hand
in hand with Social Security provisions for actuarially-reduced benefits if a worker retires
early. 125
The opportunity to offer retirement incentives provides significant advantages to
an employer. Employers frequently can achieve the benefits of mandatory retirement by
encouraging voluntary retirement. For example, early retirement incentives are often a
less harmful method than layoffs for implementing workforce reductions and corporate
reorganizations.126 In the last twenty years workforce reductions have reached into the
ranks of mid- and upper-management. 27 In response, employers have become more
sophisticated in reducing their workforce. Rather than automatically laying off employ-
ees, management may devise a series of actions, including a hiring freeze and programs
to encourage employees to resign or retire. This yields two advantages to the employer.
First, because older employees tend to be longer term and higher paid, the employer is
likely to save more per employee by eliminating those positions or replacing the retired
worker with lower-paid workers. Second, if a retirement incentive program is truly
voluntary, employees who elect to retire receive a benefit that they would not otherwise
receive. That employee is much more likely to be happy about leaving the company and
has more financial stability than the employee who is involuntarily laid off and receives
only severance benefits. 28 An employee who leaves happily is also less likely to litigate. 129
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 415(7), 416(l)(2) (1982). The Federal Employees Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 8336 (1982), permits the voluntary retirement of federal employees who have reached the age of
50 with 20 years of service or those of any age with 25 years of service. This plan was upheld in a
pre-1978 ADEA challenge. Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977).
126 S. RHINE, supra note 123, at 7 (80% of surveyed companies which offered open-window
early-retirement incentives did so "to cut costs by reducing the workforce without resorting to
involuntary layoffs"); 5 U.S.C. § 8336(d)(2) (1982) (authorizes early retirement when federal agency
is going through a RIF).
127 BNA Special Report, White Collar Layoffs and Cutbacks, 110 LAB. REL. REP. No. 31 (Aug. 16,
1982). Modern layoffs and workforce reductions often result in a permanent scale-back of the
workforce, so that recalls are less likely. See EEOC 18TH ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1984) and cases cited
therein (discussing lawsuits filed in 1983 concerning major workforce reductions or management
reorganizations).
128 This is particularly true if the employer's decision is based on employee ranking that results
in laying-off the "least productive" employees. Congress did not deem the inherent harshness of
individualized determinations sufficient justification to allow mandatory retirement under the
ADEA. Nonetheless, individualized determinations do present problems which employers under-
standably may wish to avoid. Perry, The Prindple of Equal Protection, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1133, 1152-
53 (1981).
129 S. RHINE, supra note 123, at 12-13. Avoiding lawsuits, particularly ADEA lawsuits, can be a
powerful incentive for making departing employees happy. The typical age discrimination plaintiff
is more likely to be a white collar worker who is, through tenure or position, well-paid. Sholl &
Strang, supra note 52, at 332 (1986) (informal empirical observations). Consequently, general dam-
ages through back or front pay under the ADEA accrue more quickly than damages in similar suits
under Title VII, which typically involve less well-paid employees. See generally Hawks, Future Damages
in ADEA Cases, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 357 (1986). This, in addition to the procedural benefits available
to plaintiffs in ADEA discrimination suits, makes ADEA claims more expensive for employers. For
example, in Fiscal Year 1983 the EEOC's average dollar settlement for an ADEA claim was two
times the average settlement under Title VII and five times the average settlement under the Equal
Pay Act. EEOC 18TH ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1983) (average ADEA settlement $9,667; Title VII
$4,675; EPA $1,818; ADEA settlement represents 54% increase over average dollar benefits for
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There is also the obvious benefit to employee morale and public relations. The public
interest at first glance appears satisfied because the factors that motivated eliminating
mandatory retirement are absent when a worker voluntarily retires.
The employer may gain other advantages in implementing a voluntary incentive
retirement program. Occasionally an employee who elects to retire saves the employer
the painful task of making a merit-based termination. In addition, the well-publicized
demographic trends indicate that the United States workforce is growing older.130 Al-
though early retirement has both positive and negative aspects from a business perspec-
tive,131 one perceived benefit is that early retirement opens up career opportunities for
younger workers. 32 Companies often have predictable advancement steps for employees.
For example, one moves from accounts assistant, to accounts manager, to department
head. When a position at one step is held by a worker who does not have the ability to
move on to the next level, that position is no longer available as a training ground for
other employees. Although no absolute correlation exists between age and so-called
"position blockage," there is an obvious correlation between moving up the corporate
ladder and age. High level employees generally are older because it takes years of work
to reach that level. As the Supreme Court noted when it rejected an equal protection
challenge to mandatory retirement, encouraging employees to retire may create "pre-
dictable promotion[al] opportunities and thus spur morale and stimulate superior per-
formance in the ranks."'' 3
Standing alone, these rationales for why employers offer voluntary retirement may
not justify allowing incentives. Although employers may receive a benefit from a ho-
mogenous workforce, it is a benefit that is extraordinarily slight when compared to the
negative personal and societal consequences of race, sex, or national origin discrimina-
tion. Noting significant non-discriminatory reasons for the employer to offer retirement
incentives, however, does indicate that allowing incentives will not automatically perpet-
uate age stereotypes by employers. 3 4 Even if some retirement incentives are motivated
by age stereotypes, employees who are offered the choice still have a wider range of
Fiscal Year 1982). See also EEOC 17TH ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1982) (average ADEA settlement $6,297;
Title VII $4,524; EPA $2,038; ADEA settlement represents 46% decrease over average dollar
benefits for Fiscal Year 1981); EEOC 16TH ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1981) (average ADEA settlement
$11,631; Title VII $3,787; EPA $1,861).
130 See Rones, supra note 105 and Foner, supra note 67 at 19-20.
131 For the purposes of this discussion I have focused on the positive aspects of early retirement.
Early retirement incentives can have some negative consequences, however. For example, older
employees are often the most experienced workers and a voluntary retirement program may be
"too successful" and depletes the employer of too many experienced workers.
152 S. RHINE, supra note 123 at 11.
133 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 98 (1979) (accepts legislative conclusion regarding value of
mandatory retirement). See also Lamb v. Scripps College, 627 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1980); Palmer v.
Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d
761, 767 (Mo. 1978) ("permits an orderly attrition"); Perry, supra note 128. Employees may also
believe that it is time to give someone else a turn. See Perry, supra note 128. For the obligatory
Latin phrase, consider "tempus abire tibi est," loosely translated as "make way for someone else."
Horace gave this advice to those who had ceased being productive. See E. EHRuCH, AMO, AMAS,
AMAT AND MORE: How TO USE LATIN TO YOUR OWN ADVANTAGE AND TO THE ASTONISHMENT OF
OTHERS 275 (1985).
134 Age animus in this context means that the employer does not think older employees are as
valuable as younger employees. In a workforce reduction, an employer may similarly value em-
ployees of all ages but still prefer to institute voluntary retirement rather than involuntary layoffs.
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options than they would if incentives were not allowed. So long as the employee has the
option of turning down the incentive to retire and will not be subjected to age discrim-
ination if the incentive is declined - an important caveat - retirement incentives yield
sufficient benefit to individual employees that they should be allowed.
C. Incentives and Social Benefit
Although voluntary early retirement can have positive benefits from the perspectives
of both employers and employees, the social benefit is not as clear. Because a significant
portion of governmental retirement benefits are funded by current workers, the United
States workforce can only support a finite number of retired workers at current benefit
levels.135 The best example is the recent concern over the solvency of Social Security in
light of changing demographics. In its effort to shore up the Social Security system,
Congress has taken steps to discourage early retirement, such as raising the eligibility
age for Social Security and the eligibility age for early retirement, both of which will be
gradually phased in over the next decades.'- 6 Obviously, by raising the eligibility age for
retirement the employee works longer, contributes to Social Security for a longer period
and, so long as increased longevity does not outstrip the raised eligibility age, the payout
period is shorter. Congress could have more vigorously discouraged early retirement by
more radically amending Social Security to prohibit all early retirement and requiring
proof of need before an individual could receive benefits. By regulating private pensions,
Congress also could have prohibited such plans from providing pension benefits before
the age of 65 or 70. Instead, Congress made moderate adjustments to Social Security
and made the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 157 the statute that
directly regulates pension plans, generally consistent with Social Security. 3s
Presumably, Congress took a moderate approach to Social Security and ERISA not
only bec~iise of the perceived benefits of retirement, but also because the American
public strongly believes that such benefits are vested property rights not to be tampered
with lightly. 39 Social Security and ERISA directly regulate financial options to retire and
consequently are the appropriate forum for regulating the trend toward early retirement.
By modifying Social Security and ERISA, the political process has already begun to deal
with the social impact of early retirement.
Not only are the Social Security Act and ERISA uniquely suited for regulating
national retirement poiicy, inclhding the fundamental question of whether retirement
should be encouraged, but the ADEA is also uniquely ill-suited for this task. The ADEA's
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
136 See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-21, Title I, § 201(a), (c)(1)(D), Title
III, §§ 301(c)(1), 303, 304(c), 305(c), 309(j)-(k), 332(a), 333(a), 97 Stat. 65, 107-09, 111, 112, 114,
117, 129 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416 (1982 and Supp. III 1985)). See also H.R. REP. No. 25,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 219.
137 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
138 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1106 reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws, Pamphlet No. 9A, 1,336; H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. N-ws 4075, 4527.
'39 See generally M. GLENDON, supra note 68, at 87-92. This perception is accurate in this author's
view, although what is "earned" is subject to dispute. Rather than reducing the attractiveness of
early retirement, Congress could force employers to enhance the attractiveness of employment for
older workers. Congress could, for example, require employers to give equal benefits to older and
younger employees without cost differentiation to the employees.
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provisions are limited to considering the more immediate question of whether age
discrimination played a part in the employer's decision concerning an individual em-
ployee. Such case-by-case determinations are not the appropriate vehicle for developing
a national retirement policy. So long as the employer provides a retirement incentive
that is voluntary, the incentives should be viewed as consistent with the goals of the
ADEA.
Thus, two delicately balanced policies are at work: (1) adverse treatment in employ-
ment because of one's age is a social evil that the ADEA prohibits; (2) early retirement
is an attractive option to a significant number of American workers that the ADEA
should not prohibit. Early retirement options are attractive, however, only to the extent
that they provide additional options that the employee can voluntarily accept or reject.
Although retirement incentives should not be inherently suspect, the same perceived
advantages that cause an employer to offer voluntary retirement can cause an employer
to undermine the voluntariness of the incentive program. Some check is necessary to
prevent these offers from becoming a disguised form of involuntary retirement or a way
to discriminate against specific employees within the protected class who are excluded
from an incentive plan. The need for controls on retirement incentives varies with the
position of the employee who is challenging the incentives. Employees included in
retirement incentives are susceptible to a different form of discrimination than are
employees who are excluded from retirement incentives. The following section discusses
the controls needed to protect both included and excluded employees.
III. INCLUDED V. EXCLUDED EMPLOYEES
A. Demonstrating a Prima Fade Case
In order to understand the position of the employee offered a retirement incentive,
it is necessary to discuss briefly the elements of a prima facie age discrimination case.
When employees claim that they have been wrongfully terminated because of their age,
they may use two methods to prove discrimination.1 40 First, a plaintiff occasionally can
show direct evidence of discrimination. For example, if the employer maintains a written
policy requiring all employees to retire at age 60, this policy is a facial violation of the
ADEA.141 Unless the employer can show that the policy falls within one of the Act's
affirmative defenses, the employer will be held liable. 42 With direct evidence, such as a
written policy, there are no ambiguous facts from which the fact finder must draw
inferences. As noted above, however, retirement incentives should not be presumptively
invalid and consequently should not be deemed direct evidence of age discrimination. 43
Absent direct evidence of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show facts underlying
his or her termination from which the fact finder may infer age discrimination. In
determining what constitutes a prima facie case of age discrimination, courts are heavily
140 See Eglit, supra note 49, at 165-77.
4 Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
4 See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1985) (airline policy requiring
pilots to retire at age 60 directly violated ADEA, court must evaluate validity of affirmative defenses).
See Eglit, supra note 49, at 170-72.
1 See supra notes 93-139 and accompanying text.
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influenced by decisions under Title VII144 - the statute that prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin - and uses language very similar
to the ADEA. 45 At a minimum, the plaintiff must show that he or she was within the
protected class (age 40 or over) and was qualified to remain employed but was nonetheless
discharged.46 In addition, many courts require supplemental evidence from which a
fact finder could conclude that age was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to
discharge the plaintiff. 47 Certain courts also require some showing that a younger
employee assumed some or all of plaintiff's duties. 148
B. Included Employees
Not only does the ADEA's language require that the employer's conduct be moti-
vated by age, the employee must also demonstrate that the employer "discriminated
against" him or her. 49 The formulations of the prima facie case all focus on causation
and permit the fact finder to infer that the employer has taken the adverse action because
of age. Because in most circumstances it is evident that the employer took adverse action,
courts have not expressly articulated a requirement that the plaintiff be "discriminated
4 Compare the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 etseq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985) with Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1), which provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his for her] compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits employers from segregating employees or applicants in any
way that would deprive the individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
the employee's status because of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. The
ADEA includes a parallel provision. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1982).
145 Cases that established the elements of a Title VII prima facie case arose in hiring contexts.
See, e.g., McDonnell Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
146 Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937
(1983). See generally 2 H. EGLrr, supra note 42, § 17.61.
'47 See, e.g., Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982); Williams
v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); Franci
v. Avco Corp., Avco Lycoming Div., 538 F. Supp. 250, 256 (D. Conn. 1982).
148 See, e.g., Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 959 (1981); Franci, 538 F. Supp. at 260-61. Whether the plaintiff must show that he or
she was replaced by a younger employee depends upon the circumstances. In many cases the
defendant has instituted a workforce reduction, in which case the ADEA plaintiff will not be
replaced at all. In these circumstances courts reasonably have concluded that it is not necessary for
the plalntiff to prove that a younger employee assumed his or her position. See, e.g., 2 H. EGLIT,
supra note 42, § 17.61. In corporate reorganization cases a plaintiff may be required to show that
a younger employee performing similar tasks at a similar level was retained. See, e.g., Syvock v.
Milwaukee Boiler Mfg., 665 F.2d 149, 152-54 (7th Cir. 1981); Pirone v. Home Ins. Co., 559 F.
Supp. 306,309 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Kahn v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Group, 547 F. Supp. 736,739 (E.D.N.Y.
1982); Goff v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1831, 1835 (S.D.E
W.Va. 1981), aff'd mem., 679 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1982). See generally 2 H. EGUIT, supra note 42,
§ 17.60.
1 This element is similar to requiring damages in tort suits. Defendant may have had a duty
and breached it, but so long as it caused no damage, there is no liability. W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON
TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984).
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against" as an element of a prima facie case. Nonetheless, discrimination against the
plaintiff is an essential element of plaintiff's case.
An employer's mere offer of an incentive to retire and an employee's acceptance is
not, in isolation, evidence that the plaintiff has been "discriminated against." So long as
the option is truly voluntary, the retirement incentive enhances the employee's options.
Because many employees wish to retire,'. 0 courts cannot infer that an employee's retire-
ment is evidence of harm. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Henn v.
National Geographic Society, "[w]hen one option makes the recipient better off, and the
other is the status quo, then the offer is beneficial."'' Consequently, an employee who
accepts an early retirement incentive cannot establish a prima facie age discrimination
claim simply by demonstrating that the retirement incentives exist. The employer need
not rely on a section 4(f)(2) defense because the included employee has not demonstrated
a prima facie case of age discrimination. 52
Employees who accept early retirement plans, however, may establish an ADEA
violation by showing underlying facts and circumstances that raise a factual issue re-
garding whether the employer's actions made the employee's choice involuntary. The
most common method litigants use to raise the issue of involuntary termination is the
doctrine of "constructive discharge."'55
1. Voluntariness and Constructive Discharge
In employment law, courts recognize that an employer can manipulate the terms
and conditions of employment and make them so unpleasant that an employee resigns.
At first glance, the resignation may appear voluntary but a realistic appraisal of the
circumstances surrounding the resignation may show that the employer unlawfully pres-
sured the employee into resigning. This is known as "constructive discharge."''  Con-
structive discharge exists when "a reasonable person in the employee's position would
have felt compelled to resign."' 55 In addition, a few courts also require the employee to
demonstrate that the employer had specific intent to coerce th resignation. 56 This
150 See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
15819 F.2d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 1987).
'
52 Id. at 826-27.
155 See infra notes 154-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of "constructive discharge."
Filing the age discrimination suit is one way to demonstrate that the plaintiff did not desire the
result. Merely filing the lawsuit, however, cannot be the basis for concluding that plaintiff must
have suffered a result he or she did not want at the time. A plaintiff might well decide to retire,
but be less satisfied with retirement than hoped.
'5 See generally Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1484-86 (N.D. Ill.
1987); Comment, Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and the ADEA, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 561 (1986);
Note, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge In Title VII Litigation, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 587
(1986) [hereinafter Note, Constructive Discharge].
15- Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 1981). In Downey the
plaintiff alleged that he took early retirement after his superior advised him that he might be
discharged and lose certain benefits. Id. The court found that "[a] reasonable person might well
feel compelled to resign in the face of such a statement." Id. See Note, Constructive Discharge, supra
note 154, at 588 & nn.6-13.
56 See, e.g., EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983) (Title VII);
Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981) (Title VII); Muller v. United
States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 1975) (Title VII). Because the dividing line between
legal and illegal retirement "offers" under the ADEA is whether the employee's acceptance was
March 1988]
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
definition of constructive discharge helps to define involuntariness, but fails to give
sufficient guidelines to allow a court to determine when an employee's acceptance of a
retirement incentive is involuntary. 57
When making a decision whether to retire, an employee must weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of staying employed against the advantages and disadvantages of
accepting the retirement option. With retirement incentives, the employer can construc-
tively discharge an employee in two ways. First, the employer can manipulate the retire-
ment offer to make it facially more attractive than it would be with careful consideration.
Second, the employer can manipulate the terms and conditions of employment to make
the alternative of staying employed unattractive. Either type of manipulation is likely to
cause the employee to elect retirement.
If the employer offers the incentive in a manner that precludes the employee from
carefully considering the option, the employee faces considerable pressure to accept the
incentive. The employee's voluntariness is undermined not because the employer has
made employment unattractive, but because the employer has made the incentive offer
more attractive than it might be if the employee had an opportunity to review it carefully.
In these circumstances, courts determine whether there is duress or coercion, as with all
factors that make up voluntariness, by the totality of the circumstances. If the employee
has the opportunity to make a measured decision and to consider carefully what is in
his or her best interest, then the employer has made a true option available to the
employee. Particularly if the employee takes time to consider the offer'58 or consults
with an attorney or financial advisor 5 9 there is evidence of lack of coercion.
The ADEA's goal, however, is not to protect the employee from difficult choices
but rather to protect the employee from unlawful choices. Consequently, constructive
discharge must involve more than proof that the offer was a good deal or that the
decision was difficult to make.160 A reasonable, prudent, risk-adverse person might decide
to accept a "sure thing." The essence of bargaining, however, is that the parties exchange
consideration. 16 Consequently, an employee's need or desire for the benefits offered, in
voluntary, in this context the "reasonable prudent employee" standard, which focuses on the
plaintiff, should apply. Even if a court requires the employer to have specific intent this standard
is easily satisfied by the fact that the employer offers incentives to encourage the employee to retire.
157 The distinction between "volititary" and "involuntary" has puzzled philosophers for cen-
turies and this discussion does not atitmpt to resolve the philosophical problems. Rather, this
discussion is intended to contribute to the case-by-case development of constructive discharge
analysis.
1-1 See, e.g., Paolllo v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 821 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1987) (employees must be
given a reasonable time to reflect and to weigh their options); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock
Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 69-70 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff took four weeks to consider plan before signing).
Cf. Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1987) (brevity of time in
which to make a decision does not make a choice involuntary, but may show that a person could
not digest the information necessary to make the decision).
'59 See, e.g., Lancaster v. Buerke Buick Honda Co., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 721, 721
(D. Minn.. 1985).
160 See Henn, 819 F.2d at 826 ("That the benefits may overwhelm the recipient and dictate the
choice cannot be dispositive. The question 'Would you prefer $100,000 to $500,000?' would elicit
the same answer from everyone, but it does not on that account produce an 'involuntary' response.").
161 Although few employees have equal bargaining power with their employers, inequality of
bargaining power cannot alone be enough to vitiate a contract. The relationship between a prosecutor
and criminal defendant is hardly one of the parties bargaining with equal strength, yet the rela-
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itself, is not enough to show coercion or lack of voluntariness. 162 If need or desire were
sufficient to show involuntariness, the more generous the retirement incentives, the
more likely the plaintiff could show a constructive discharge. 163 This bizarre result would
serve neither the interests of the employees nor the employers.
An employee's decision to retire will also be affected by his or her perception of the
advantages and disadvantages of staying employed. Many factors in the employee's
analysis may be extrinsic to both the employer and employee. For example, a recession
might have caused a slump in business, or new technology or increased foreign com-
petition might have made the business less profitable. The employer may elect to reduce
the workforce by offering retirement incentives prior to layoffs. It is likely that no
unlawful age discriminatory acts entered into these factors. Consequently, even though
an employee might feel compelled to accept a retirement offer because of the uncertainty
of future employment, the employee's acceptance should not be deemed involuntary.
Similarly, courts should not deem pressures extrinsic to the employer, but not to
the employee, sufficient to show constructive discharge. For example, if an employee is
seriously ill and receives a retirement incentive, that employee might feel that the only
reasonable thing to do is to accept the offer. This acceptance, however, should not
constitute constructive discharge. In other words, it must be the employer's acts, rather
than independent circumstances or external pressures surrounding the employee, that
coerce the "reasonable, prudent employee" to accept a retirement offer in order to
constitute constructive discharge.164
Defining constructive discharge becomes more difficult when courts must consider
factors that may be extrinsic to the employee but not the employer. For example, poor
upper management business decisions may have caused a business slump, resulting in
impending layoffs in the employee's department. Again, the employer has probably not
acted unlawfully in violation of the ADEA; it is safe to presume that an employer will
not sabotage a business enterprise just to eliminate a segment of the workforce. Absent
proof that this has occurred, a court cannot infer age discrimination from the fact that
a business fails and workers are laid off. Yet, whatever the cause of the business slump,
tionship does not render a criminal plea bargain involuntary. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
750-55 (1970).
162 Inland Empire Builders, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1370, 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (quoting
Fruhauf Southwest Garment Co. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 945, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1953)); W.R.
Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Go., 248 F.2d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 912
(1958). Cf. Coral Gables Imported Motorcars, Inc. v. Fiat Motors, 673 F.2d 1234, 1239, modified 680
F.2d 105 (11th Cir. 1982) (construing New York law), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1973).
163 See Henn, 819 F.2d at 824.
164 Even if the employer seeks to take advantage of the employee's illness by offering the
incentive to retire, the employee is better off with the option of the incentive retirement. So long as
the employee can assess the advantages and disadvantages of leaving, and so long as the employee
is not treated adversely because of his or her age or his or her decision to turn down the incentive,
the employer's motive should not determine whether the law allows the option. For example, two
manufacturers offer incentives to retire. One employer is motivated by a need to reduce the
workforce by 25%, the other by a desire to purge the company of "old foggies." Older employees
at both companies are contemplating retirement. If motives were the dispositive variable, one
employee will get the benefit of the added money, the second will be denied that option by operation
of law. In other words, so long as the option is truly voluntary, to disallow incentives punishes the
employees as much as it would the employer. Motive should be a factor, however, in determining
on what grounds an older employee may be excluded from a retirement incentive.
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the employee is likely to feel significant pressure to accept a retirement offer. Pressure
in this context again should not be sufficient to demonstrate a constructive discharge.
In contrast to the difficult situations presented above, the clearest case of constructive
discharge is shown where the employer manipulates the employee's day-to-day work
conditions because of age. When the employer's acts would independently violate the
ADEA, a constructive discharge occurs. As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in Henn v.
National Geographic, "[i]f the terms on which [the employees] remained [employed] were
themselves violations of the ADEA, then taking the offer of early retirement was making
the best of things, a form of minimization of damages."'' 65 If the employer places
economic pressure on the employee, such as demoting the employee or lowering the
employee's salary because of the employee's age, this would be sufficient to show con-
structive discharge.'6 Constructive discharge is appropriately found, for example, when
the employer gives the older employees a choice of early retirement or termination, yet
younger employees are also given the opportunity to transfer,67 or where an employee
has previously been denied a promotion or raise, 68 or received a significant reduction
in work duties,169 or was transferred to an inferior sales territory170 and these conditions
were not imposed upon younger, similarly-situated employees. In these examples the
older employee is subject to adverse employment conditions because of his or her age.
Age discrimination is also demonstrated in much more subtle ways than the examples
noted above. An employee might reasonably wish to have his or her supervisor's advice
concerning whether to accept the retirement incentive. A supervisor might tell the
employee that he or she has no future with the employer. The supervisor's assessment
might be an honest, merit-based statement that the employee reasonably should consider
in deciding whether to accept the retirement incentive. That assessment, however, also
might be motivated by age animus or the supervisor's perception that older employees
should retire to open up opportunities for younger employees. If age stereotypes mo-
,tivate the supervisor's advice, then the employee's choice has been skewed by age bias,
'65Henn, 819 F.2d at 829. The Henn court used too stringent a standard for constructive
discharge. At the end of its opinion the court concluded that "[t]he reasonable inferences from this
record would not allow a jury to infer that the plaintiffs would have been fired [in violation of the
ADEA] had they turned down the offer of early retirement, and without such a constructive
discharge they cannot undo their choice to retire." Id. at 830. Constructive discharge should not
require proof that the plaintiffs would have been fired if they had remained. The goal of the
constructive discharge doctrine is to reach sophisticated employers who recognize that they cannot
fire an employee outright because of the employee's protected status. This employer may never
intend to fire the employee, but only to make life so intolerable that the employee will leave of his
or her own accord. The Seventh Circuit recognized this problem in Karlen v. City Colleges of
Chicago, No. 87-1051 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 1988) (available Feb. 14, 1988, on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Courts file).
166 See, e.g., Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 721, 722-
23 (D. Minn. 1985), and cases cited therein.
67 See, e.g., Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983) (employee applied for a number of open positions, all of which were
given to younger employees).
168 See, e.g., Reussow v. Eddington, 483 F. Supp. 739, 742-44 (D. Colo. 1980); EEOC v. Hay
Assocs., 545 F. Supp. 1064, 1086-87 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
169 See, e.g., Scott v. OCE Indus., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 141, 145 (N.D. Il. 1982).
170 Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984) (transfer to inferior sales
territory).
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a factor that the ADEA explicitly proscribes.' 71 The goal of any constructive discharge
doctrine is to divide such prohibited age-biased considerations from acceptable non-age
factors.
Absent additional discovery, however, it will often be difficult to show that by merely
giving specific advice an employer has violated the ADEA. Consequently, when dealing
with retirement incentives courts should hold that an employee has articulated a prima
facie ADEA case when he or she alleges that the defendant employer offered the
employee an incentive to retire, specifically advised the employee to accept the offer,
that this advice was motivated by age animus, and as a result of that advice the employee
accepted the incentive. 72 For example, if an employee alleges that she was offered an
incentive to retire, that her supervisor came to her and painted a bleak picture of her
future with the company and hinted broadly that her position was tenuous, few em-
ployees would risk not accepting the incentive to retire. If the employee believes in good
faith that age animus motivated the advice, and makes that allegation in her complaint,
this should be sufficient to raise a factual issue about whether her acceptance was
voluntary. 73 If certain employees are singled out and encouraged to reject the incentive,
however, those employees cannot show a constructive discharge if they elect to accept
the incentive. If the employer encourages the employee to stay employed, arid the
employee nonetheless retires, the reasonable inference is that the employee wished to
voluntarily retire, and that act is fully consistent with the ADEA. Employees whom the
employer simply ignores, even though other employees were encouraged to stay, present
a more problematic case. Again, only additional information will show whether an
employer's age bias was a factor in the employer's failure to encourage these employees
to reject the incentive offer.
2. The Consequence of Showing Constructive Discharge
Once a plaintiff shows facts from which a court may infer constructive discharge,
the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a non-age based reason for the action174
If the employer produces evidence that its actions or advice were not based on age, then
the burden of persuasion shifts back to plaintiff to persuade the fact-finder that age was
a factor in the employer's advice, and that but for the advice the plaintiff would not
171 An employer's pressure on all employees may not constitute a constructive discharge, but
simply a difficult clioice. If the plaintiff shows only that business was declining and that pressure
was placed on all salespersons to increase output, for example, these facts are insufficient to raise
an inference of constructive discharge. A reasonable employee might well feel it advantageous to
accept an incentive retirement rather than remain in that work environment, but the factfinder
cannot infer that these non-incentive pressures were age related. If, however, the plaintiff also
showed that he or she received harsher evaluations than similarly-situated younger employees, a
factfinder could infer that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to accept the incentive
program because of the employer's age-related acts, even though these actions do not directly relate
to the incentive program. The court should find an ADEA violation on these facts even if no
retirement incentive were involved. A violation in conjunction with a retirement incentive is simply
a factor to consider in structuring the plaintiff's remedy.
172 Pleading a prima facie case in this context is subject to the same limitations as any lawsuit
in federal court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (attorney or party signature constitutes that "to the best of
his [or her] knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry [the pleading] is
well grounded in fact ... .
173 Id.
174 See, e.g., Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1212-13 (7th Cir. 1985).
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have accepted the incentive. 175 The employer will generally attempt to show that the
termination 76 was based on reasonable factors other than age.' 77 For example, the
employee's future with the employer may be limited because of his or her poor perfor-
mance, not because of age. In that case, the fact that the employer offered the employee
retirement incentives in addition to the option of regular termination does not violate
the ADEA. 78 Consequently, if the employer had good cause to terminate the employee,
or change the employee's duties, or transfer the employee to an inferior position, the
fact that the employer also offered the employee an early retirement option should not
create liability under the ADEA. 179 For example, in Toussant v. Ford Motor Company, the
employee claimed that he accepted an early retirement incentive only because the em-
ployer discriminatorily eliminated his position.8 6 Although the court recognized that an
employee in similar circumstances might have felt compelled to resign because of the
job elimination, the court found no constructive discharge because it determined that
the employer eliminated the job not because of age discrimination but because of "eco-
nomic realities."'' The court concluded that the plaintiff made a "studied choice" that
was "the preferred way out of a difficult situation.'18 2
The great practical danger of early retirement incentive programs is that they are
often administered in ways that raise a factual inference of constructive discharge. A
supervisor, motivated by sincere concern for the employee, will often encourage an
employee to accept an early retirement offer.85 Once a court concludes that an issue of
fact exists concerning whether the employee was constructively discharged, summary
judgment becomes impossible. 18 4 The case will then go to a jury, if a jury trial is de-
manded, and a jury is likely to look carefully at whether the employer treated the
employee fairly, rather than looking solely at the narrow question of whether any
unfairness was based on age discrimination. 8 5 Consequently, although employers may
in theory lawfully both offer retirement incentives and encourage certain employees to
accept or reject them, that course of conduct is extremely risky if the employer wants to
avoid any legal complications.
175 Id.
176 Termination in this context means that the early retirement offer was made in circumstances
that indicate that the acceptance was not voluntary.
177 See Eglit, supra note 49.
178 See infra notes 179-83.
1 9 See, e.g., Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 410-12 (9th Cir. 1981). The primary
difficulty with the concept of constructive discharge is that an employer lawfully may act in a nasty
manner, so long as he or she is not nasty because of the employee's age. This can be called the
"equal [jerk] defense" - the employer was nasty to everyone on a neutral basis, This theoretically
useful defense may not be successful in practice because age discrimination suits are tried to ajury.
Despite the judge's charge, when deciding liability, juries are more likely to look at the underlying
fairness of the employer's conduct than at any lack of disparity in the employer's conduct.
180 582 F.2d 812, 816 (10th Cir. 1978).
181 Id.
182 Id.
185 See Saltzman v. Fullerton Metals Co., 661 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1981) ("perhaps you ought
to look for work elsewhere" and "maybe you'd better leave").
1' See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (summary judgment may be rendered when the moving party
shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law").
185 See supra note 179.
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In a purely objective world, employees should have the maximum amount of infor-
mation possible before making a decision whether to accept a retirement incentive.
Ironically, in order to reduce the chance of going to trial on an age discrimination claim,
employers may withhold job performance information from employees during the pe-
riod the retirement incentive offer is made. If an employer has followed good personnel
practices by giving honest and periodic evaluations, the employee will be aware of his
or her employment status. If the employer has not kept employees accurately informed
of their performance, many employees will actively seek their supervisor's advice con-
cerning their employment status. Unfortunately, structuring the ADEA essentially to
encourage employers to withhold this information may be a necessary cost in order to
properly protect employees under the ADEA. If specific advice were not sufficient to
raise a factual inference of constructive discharge,8 6 it would be almost impossible for
courts to monitor employer pressure and guarantee that employers do not use retirement
incentives as an indirect method of implementing mandatory retirement.
If the plaintiff demonstrates a prima fade case of constructive discharge which the
defendant fails to rebut, a section 4(f)(2) defense - that the incentive is a bona fide
employee benefit plan and not a subterfuge to evade the ADEA - is not available to
the defendant. Section 4(f)(2) may not be used to "require or permit the involuntary
retirement" of an individual. If the fact finder concludes that a constructive discharge
has occurred, the retirement was involuntary and by its terms the section 4(f)(2) defense
is inapplicable. If the fact finder concludes that no constructive discharge occurred, then
the retirement was voluntary and there was no ADEA violation.
C. Excluded Employees and Variable Benefits
In order to understand the interests of excluded employees and employees offered
fewer benefits, it is necessary to revisit the definition of the protected class under the
ADEA. Employees under the age of 40 who are excluded from a retirement incentive
plan have no standing to challenge their exclusion because they are not protected by the
ADEA.187 Once an employee reaches the magical age of 40, however, the ADEA's
protections apply with full force. If an employer offers an incentive plan under identical
terms to all employees over 40 years old, the ADEA is not violated because employees
are not subject to different terms or conditions of employment because of age. 88 Any
186 Specific advice must be coupled with the plaintiff's allegation that age animus motivated the
advice.
187 Consequently, employers can discriminate against employees under 40 because of their age
without fear of legal repercussions. Employees under 40 may, however, receive incidental relief.
The EEOC regulations allow the EEOC to receive any "complaints" of discrimination. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1626.5 (1987). A worker under age 40 may send a letter of complaint and if the practice
complained of also affects workers over 40, the EEOC may institute its own inquiry. If a 37-year
old applicant is denied a position as a firefighter because a city only accepts applicants under the
age of 35, for example, the EEOC may challenge the policy because it also affects persons within
the protected class. If the EEOC cooperates with the complainant, the remedial decree may require
the city to abandon its policy and reconsider all persons previously denied a position because of
that policy. In this way, the worker under 40 receives a remedy.
188 See, e.g., Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(2) (1987) ("Where an employer
under an employee benefit plan provides the same level of benefits to older workers as to younger
workers, there is no violation of section 4(a), and accordingly the practice does not have to be
justified under section 4(f)(2).").
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distinctions between a 40 year old and a 70 year old based solely on age, however, raises
age discrimination problems. 89 The employee is no longer being given a benefit "based
on ability rather than age."'9 0 Although logically one might argue that the problems of
age discrimination intensify as one grows older, and therefore greater protection accrues
as the employee advances within the protected class, nothing in the ADEA's general
prohibitions provides for such a differentiation.' 91 Rather, intra-class distinctions must
be justified under section 4(f)(2).192 Consequently, an employer can make age-based
distinctions if those distinctions meet the requirements of section 4(f)(2), which allows
an employer "to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or bona fide employee
benefit plan ... which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA." 9 s
1. Meeting the Requirements of Section 4(f)(2)
Section 4(f)(2)'s language clearly acts as an exception to the ADEA's general pro-
hibitions. This exception is cumbersome to interpret because words such as "bona fide,"
"subterfuge," and "employee benefit plan" are not precisely defined. In addition, there
is little legislative history to help determine the scope of this exception. 94 Consequently,
the meaning of section 4(f)(2) is determined largely by logical inferences drawn by
examining its words in the context of the ADEA as a whole.
189 The EEOC interpretive regulations expressly provide that it is unlawful to prefer a 52-year
old to a 42-year old, or vice versa, solely because of age. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (1987).
1-29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
191 See H.R. REP. No. 805, supra note 2, at 2219 (age 40 selected because that is the age at which
age discrimination in employment "becomes evident"). Yet one express purpose of the ADEA is
"to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). Other benefits that would meet problems arising out of
the impact of age on employment might also call for intragroup distinctions. Recognizing this fact,
the EEOC interpretations of the ADEA provide that:
The extension of additional benefits, such as increased severance pay, to older em-
ployees within the protected age bracket may be lawful if an employer has a reasonable
basis to conclude that those benefits will counteract problems related to age discrimi-
nation. The extension of those additional benefits may not be used as a means to
accomplish practices otherwise prohibited by the Act.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(b) (1987). Although Congress designated workers over age 40 as the protected
class, the problems confronting various age groups within the class are not equal. The ADEA does
not, however, expressly authorize affirmative action programs for the elderly. Although this rea-
sonable statement in the regulations above comports with the ADEA's purposes, nothing in the Act
provides expressly for enhanced severance benefits because of age. In order to be valid, such a
program would have to fall within the § 4(f)(2) exemption or be either a reasonable factor other
than age or a bona fide occupational qualification. The validity of enhanced severance benefits
because of advanced age is outside the scope of this Article, although the conclusions drawn herein
would aid in analyzing such benefits. See generally General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141
(1976) (Title VII interpretive regulations do not have the force of law because Congress did not
confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to Title VII; courts
may refer to the interpretations for guidance but need not follow them).
19 2 See United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 207 (1977) (White, J. concurring) ("all
retirement plans necessarily make distinctions based on age"); Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901,
910 (3d Cir. 1977) ("there is obviously discrimination because of age ... in any retirement plan,
voluntary or involuntary"). See also Cipriano v. Board of Educ., N. Tonawanda, 785 F.2d 51 (2d
Cir. 1986).
193 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
'94 See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
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a. Employee Benefit Plans
Section 4(f)(2) applies to "any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement,
pension, or insurance plan ...."195 The terms "retirement" and "pension plan" appear
to encompass retirement incentives, particularly because incentives generally are con-
joined with a traditional retirement or pension plan. 96 Retirement incentives would also
appear to fall logically within section 4(f)(2)'s expansive language, which indicates that
other unenumerated plans may also fall within the definition of a "bona fide employee
benefit plan."' 97 In addition, recently revised EEOC interpretive regulations define an
employee benefit plan as "a plan, such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which
provides employees with what are frequently referred to as 'fringe benefits."' 98 Retire-
ment incentives which are not given as a wage for services rendered fall within this
definition.' 99
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) contains the most compre-
hensive definition of the phrase "employee benefit plan" and lends further support to
including retirement incentives within employee benefit plans.200 Although enacted seven
years after the ADEA, ERISA's definitions nonetheless aid interpretation of the ADEA. 20'
Under ERISA, an employee pension benefit plan is defined as any plan, fund, or
program that provides retirement income to employees or results in a deferral of income
by employees, including income received after termination.2 2 ERISA's definition applies
to any plan regardless of the method used to calculate or distribute the benefits. 203
,9- The definition of an employee benefit plan must include something more than simply giving
a benefit. If an "employee benefit plan" means only that a plan "must provide benefits for em-
ployees," see Patterson v. Independent School Dist. #709, 742 F.2d 465, 466 (8th Cir. 1984), then
all benefits including wages, would fall within § 4(f)(2)'s meaning. The ADEA prohibits discrimi-
nation against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). The traditional rule of
statutory construction - that exceptions to remedial legislation should be construed narrowly -
applies to the ADEA. Marshall v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
The ADEA's primary provision, which prohibits discrimination in the terms and conditions of
employment would be rendered superfluous if "employee benefit plans" were defined as simply
paying benefits. At a minimum, employee benefit plan means pension and benefit plans and
presumably certain "welfare" benefits such as life and health insurance. See KING, THE ADEA AND
EMPLOYEE BEEFrrPNs, IN ADEA: A SymPosiuM HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRAC-
TITiONERS 317 (1983).
196 Cipriano, 785 F.2d at 54 (incentive to retirement plan "when read as a supplement to an
underlying general retirement plan" was "'retirement' plan" for § 4(f)(2) purposes).
197 Id. and cases cited herein. The ADEA contains no other provisions that further define what
constitutes an employee benefit plan.
198 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(b) (1987) (term does not refer to wages or salary in cash).
I Id.
200 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
201 ERISA defines an "employee benefit plan" as an employee welfare plan and/or an employee
pension benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982). An employee welfare plan is defined, roughly, as
a plan that provides benefits such as health care, death, disability, scholarship funds, and prepaid
legal services. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
202 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1982).
203 Id. If a plan, fund, or program is covered by ERISA, it must meet a series of complicated
requirements governing disclosure and reporting, Part 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (1982), participation
and vesting, Part 2, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (1982), funding, Part 3, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86 (1982),
and fiduciary responsibility, Part 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (1982).
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ERISA's broad definition of employee benefit plan includes almost all retirement
incentive programs. 20 4 For example, if an employer continues the employee's salary
payments or provides him or her with an annuity, such programs constitute ERISA
plans because they defer income205 or because they provide retirement income.206 If an
employer provides an employee a lump sum severance'payment triggered by retirement,
under Department of Labor regulations, that too falls under ERISA.207
Although Congress could not refer to ERISA in 1967 when it first drafted section
4(f)(2), ERISA was available when Congress enacted the 1978 ADEA amendments.
The Senate Report accompanying the 1978 Amendments directly addressed the
effect of raising the ADEA's upper age limit on ERISA, and reflected Congress's
desire to reconcile the two statutes.208 ERISA also contains many age-based
requirements, including designating age 65 as "normal retirement age" and the age
at which benefits are determined.2 9 In order to prevent inconsistencies between
ERISA and the ADEA, the ADEA's definition of bona fide employee benefit
plans must be at least coextensive with ERISA. Because ERISA is the most
comprehensive regulatory statute governing pension plans and because section
4(f)(2) relates to and saves ERISA from being inconsistent with the ADEA, it is
reasonable to assume that by using the phrase "employee benefit plan" in both stat-
utes Congress at a minimum meant to reconcile the two statutes.2 10
204 An incentive to resign program not strictly tied to retirement, and consequently available to
employees of all ages, might be deemed an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA. See 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
205 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
2-Id. § 1002(2)(A)(i) (1982).
207 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(b) (1987).
208 S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 508. The Report includes a letter from the Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Employment Standards, Donald Elisburg, in which he concluded that raising
the ADEA's upper age limit would not interfere with ERISA's relevant provisions. Id. Congress's
awareness of ERISA and its desire to reconcile the two statutes supports looking to ERISA for
assistance in defining the term "employee benefit plan" under the ADEA. ERISA's goals are distinct
from, but nonetheless related to, the ADEA. ERISA's purpose is to protect employee's interests in
pensions by regulating participation, vesting, and disclosure. One statutory goal is to prevent long
service employees from losing anticipated retirement benefits due to lack of vesting or financial
failure of the plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982). See also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray
& Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984); Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 911, 941
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982). Although Congress enacted ERISA in order to achieve
greater fairness for employees, ERISA itself contains many age-based restrictions. Under ERISA,
for example, an employee need not be included in certain benefit plans if the employee begins
employment within five years of the plan's normal retirement age. 29 U.S.C. § 1052, (1982). See
also Note, Interpreting Section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA: Does Anyone Have a "Plan?", 135 U. PA. L. REv.
1055 (1987).
209 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1982). The Senate Report accompanying the ADEA expressly stated
that the ADEA "would not change the definition of normal retirement age under ERISA." S. REP.
No. 493, supra note 58, at 508. Any ERISA provisions affecting employees over age 40 because of
the employee's age would have been unlawful if judged solely by the ADEA's general prohibition.
If the § 4(f)(2) exception was intended to prevent the ERISA provisions concerning normal retire-
ment age and benefits accrual from conflicting with the ADEA, it is logical to infer that the § 4(f)(2)
exception was also intended to protect those ERISA provisions not directly at issue in the 1978
Amendments.
210 A standard rule of statutory construction is that statutes should be interpreted in par material,
so that one is not found inconsistent with another. N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 51.10 (4th ed. 1984). In addition, the last statute passed is deemed to prevail. Id. at § 51.02.
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ERISA's definition should therefore carry significant weight in interpreting section
4(f)(2).21
Concluding that retirement incentives come within the ADEA's definition of "em-
ployee benefit plan" advances but does not end the inquiry. Section 4(f)(2) is further
limited by requiring that employee benefit plans be both "bona fide" and "not a subter-
fuge" to evade the purposes of the Act.2 12 These two qualifying phrases, particularly the
latter, serve to regulate how an employer may provide retirement incentives. As a matter
of statutory construction, courts usually should not infer that two words used in the
same sentence have the same meaning because this interpretation renders one of the
phrases redundant. Both "bona fide" and "not a subterfuge," however, are fluid terms
and are vague enough to incorporate any number of ideas. Certainly the use of two
separate phrases emphasizes that Congress intended to allow courts to monitor carefully
section 4(f)(2) so'that it not become a vehicle for excusing arbitrary age discrimination.
i. Bona Fide Plans
In its lexical meaning, bona fide means true, actual, and without simulation or
pretense.213 Consistent with this meaning, many courts have held that a bona fide plan
under section 4(f)(2), at a minimum, requires the employer both to have an actual plan
and to observe the terms of that plan.2 1 4 In other words, the plan must exist and pay
benefits.2 15 Although this point may seem obvious, it serves as an important limitation.
For example, an on-the-spot offer to encourage a single employee to retire would not
constitute an exception under section 4(f)(2) because it was not part of a bona fide
plan.21
6
Because Congress enacted ERISA after the ADEA, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress
intended the later statute to be lawful under the ADEA. The Internal Revenue Code contains
extensive provisions governing what constitutes a "qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock
bonus" plan to qualify for preferential tax treatment. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). Even if an employer
discovers that an incentive program falls outside ERISA, an employer must still be concerned about
the tax consequences.
211 Including retirement incentives within the meaning of "employee benefit plan" also best
reconciles the ADEA with the goal of maximizing employee options. Because the ADEA does not
prohibit an employee from retiring if the employee so elects, and because retirement is a benefit
when voluntarily, elected, a voluntary retirement incentive program advances the Act's underlying
goals.
212 See EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 1982).
2 13 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 160 (5th ed. 1979).
214 See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 194 & n.2 (1977) (employee conceded
that "the plan was bona fide 'in the sense that it exists and pays benefits"'); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(b),
(1982) (plan is bona fide if its terms have been accurately described in writing to all employees and
it provides the benefits described); 2 H. EGLIT, supra note 42, § 16.35 n.4 and cases cited therein.
Prior to the 1978 Amendments, several courts struck down involuntary early retirement plans on
the ground that the plan did not authorize involuntary retirement. Id. § 16.34.
2 15 McMann, 434 U.S. at 194.
216 An individually-tailored offer, however, might well be deemed a settlement of an ongoing
dispute or an offer made for reasons other than age. See, e.g., Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646
F.2d 407, 410 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (extension of extra-contractual benefits to employee who was to
be terminated on neutral principles does not violate ADEA). If such an offer is made solely because
of the individual's age, however, only § 4(f)(2) would save the offer from violating the ADEA. On
the spot offers also carry a far greater likelihood that merely making the offer is coercive.
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Bona fide can also be used in a broader sense to mean without deceit or fraud.2 17
Used in this sense, bona fide comes very close to the concept of subterfuge. For example,
some courts conclude that a bona fide plan must not only exist and pay benefits, but
that the plan's benefits also must be substantial.218 Whether analyzed as part of the
"subterfuge" or as part of the "bona fide" element, a substantiality requirement serves
an important check on retirement incentives. If an employer intentionally underfunds
the generally-available retirement plan and offers significant retirement incentives, a
court reasonably could infer that the employer's retirement practices as a whole are not
bona fide.219 Without some requirement of substantiality for the underlying pension, an
employer could easily manipulate incentives to place enormous financial pressures on
employees to retire. So long as the underlying pension plan provides substantial benefits,
however, any additional incentive program should not have any substantiality require-
ment. The additional incentives are by their nature bonus payments. An extremely small
incentive, however, obviously is not likely to attract many acceptors. If many employees
accept such an incentive offer, a court is likely to look beyond the plan and inquire if
unlawful pressures were placed on the employees. 2 0
ii. Not a Subterfuge: Distinguishing Arbitrariness
The phrase "not a subterfuge" is difficult to interpret in the context of the ADEA
because, unlike race or sex or national origin discrimination, age requirements are usually
integral to retirement and pension plans. Consequently, a court could find that an
employer has violated the ADEA's policy of no age discrimination merely by offering
an age-triggered pension. Yet section 4(f)(2)'s language evinces Congress's intent to
protect retirement and pension plans. 22' Thus, "subterfuge" must be interpreted in light
of this intent to protect traditional retirement benefits.2 22 Unfortunately, neither the
courts nor the legislative history of the ADEA provide sufficient guidance concerning
the meaning of subterfuge in the context of retirement incentives.
The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of subterfuge under section 4(f)(2) in
UnitedAirLines, Inc. v. McMann.223 In 1978, the McMann Court concluded that mandatory
retirement under section 4(f)(2) was not a subterfuge to evade the ADEA, at least where
- as in McMann - the retirement plan was enacted prior to the ADEA's passage in
1967.224 The Court defined "subterfuge" very narrowly by tying it to "a scheme, plan,
217 BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 160 (5th ed. 1979).
218 See, e.g., Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1980); McMann, 434 U.S. at
206-07 (White, J. concurring); 2 H. EGLiT, supra note 42, § 16.35 and cases cited therein.
219 Cf Patterson v. Independent School Dist. #709, 742 F.2d 465, 466 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[a]n
unreasonably infinitesimal benefit would brand the plan as a subterfuge to evade the provisions of
the statute"). See also McMann, 434 U.S. at 194 & n.2, 203; EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390,
1395 (9th Cir. 1984); Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1980).
220 See supra notes 154-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of constructive discharge.
22 1 McMann, 434 U.S. at 199-200.
222 Nothing in the ADEA's language or accompanying reports indicate that the statute was
intended to eliminate age as a factor in retirement. The later passage of ERISA, which expressly
allows age-triggered benefits, makes clear that the ADEA was not intended to eliminate age as a
factor in retirement. See supra notes 200-11 for a discussion of the relationship between the ADEA
and ERISA.
22 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
224Id. at 203.
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stratagem, or artifice of evasion. 225 In other words, the Court interpreted "subterfuge"
to require specific intent to evade the ADEA. The Court also rejected a "per se" rule
requiring an employer to show an economic or business justification for any plans under
section 4(f)(2).226
The McMann decision is limited because it examines subterfuge only in the context
of retirement plans enacted before 1967.227 Because most special retirement incentives
have been planned, offered, and implemented after the ADEA's passage, McMann's
analysis does not offer a definitive determination that such incentives are not a subter-
fuge.228 On the contrary, if taken to its logical conclusion, the McMann analysis raises
potential problems for retirement incentives. If plans enacted before the ADEA was
passed in 1967 are automatically not a subterfuge, then plans amended after 1967
arguably automatically are a subterfuge to evade the ADEA.22 9 Such an analysis could
label most pension plans as a "subterfuge." An employer certainly knows that a retire-
ment plan that gives benefits to employees at 65 excludes employees under 65.230 Yet a
plan that begins benefits at age 65 is eminently reasonable when compared to the
provisions of Social Security and ERISA. Such an expansive interpretation of section
4(f)(2) would directly contravene Congress's intent to protect the retirement interests of
employees. Yet, if the McMann intent requirement means only that the'employer had ill
will, as the word "artifice" implies, then subterfuge will have a very limited meaning and
the ADEA would impose virtually no limits on how an employer structures retirement
incentives. Without some limitation, an employer could exclude all employees over a
designated age from retirement incentives without any justification.
225 Id. The Court stated:
In ordinary parlance, and in dictionary definitions as well, a subterfuge is a scheme,
plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion. In the context of this statute, "subterfuge" must
be given its ordinary meaning and we must assume Congress intended it in that sense.
So read, a plan established in 1941, if bona fide, as is conceded here, cannot be a
subterfuge to evade an Act passed 26 years later. To spell out an intent in 1941 to
evade a statutory requirement not enacted until 1967 attributes, at the very least, a
remarkable prescience to the employer. We reject any such per se rule requiring an
employer to show an economic or business purpose in order to satisfy the subterfuge
language of the Act.
Id.
226 Id.
227 See, e.g., McMann, 434 U.S. at 198 (opinion of the Court), 434 U.S. at 216 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Zinger, 549 F.2d at 904-05; EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252, 258-59 (2d Cir.
1982).228 See supra notes 6-8. When Congress amended § 4(f)(2) to prohibit mandatory retirement,
it did not expressly reject the court's reasoning in McMann. This has led at least two courts to
conclude that the 1978 amendments did not overrule McMann in its entirety. See Crosland v.
Charlotte Eye, Ear, & Throat Hosp., 686 F.2d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Maine, 644 F.
Supp. 223, 226 (D. Me. 1986). But see H.R. CONF. REa. No. 950, supra note 58.
229 See EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (post-
ADEA reaffirmation of prior discriminatory practices amounts to an evasion of the ADEA). The
United States Supreme Court has used such reasoning to divine legislative intent. See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82 (1982) (fact that later amendments
left intact statutory provisions under which lower federal courts had implied a cause of action is
itself evidence that Congress intended to preserve a private right of action).
230 See Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under
Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REv. 943 (1984).
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Section 4(f)(2)'s meager legislative history gives some help in attempting to define
"subterfuge." The Congressional Reports indicate that Congress intended to incorporate
some sort of business or cost justification within section 4(f)(2). The House Report
accompanying the 1967 version of the ADEA referred to section 4(f)(2) briefly, stating
that Congress intended that the exception "serves to emphasize the primary purpose of
the bill - hiring of older workers - by permitting employment without necessarily
including such workers in employee benefit plans."23 The Senate Report accompanying
the 1978 ADEA amendments indicated that section 4(f)(2) allows employers to make
differentiations based on age due to "increased costs for employee welfare benefit plans
such as disability, health, life, and other forms of insurance for employees." 232 In addi-
tion, the EEOC also ties subterfuge squarely to costjustifications, concluding that section
4(f)(2)'s purpose is to permit age-based reductions in benefits if they are justified "by
significant cost considerations. 23s
The Supreme Court tied subterfuge to intent and rejected a per se rule of cost
justification. The legislative history and the EEOC equate subterfuge with cost justifica-
tions. It is possible to reconcile these various visions of subterfuge by analyzing section
4(f)(2) in the context of the ADEA as a whole. The Act has three stated purposes: (1)
to promote employment of older workers based on their ability rather than age; (2) to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and (3) to help employers and
workers find ways to meet problems arising from the impact of age on employment.23 4
Section 4(f)(2) is uniquely suited to achieve the second and third goals. Consistent with
the stated purposes of the ADEA, the subterfuge language of 4(f)(2) should be read to
exempt those employer practices that are not arbitrary even though based on age and
to allow employers to structure benefits to meet the problems arising from the impact
of age on employment. The problem, of course, is defining what is "arbitrary."
No single litmus test will determine whether a plan uses arbitrary age factors and is
therefore a subterfuge. The better approach is to provide guidelines to employers, but
23 H.R. REP. No. 805, supra note 2, at 2217. In isolation, this language is not consistent with
the ADEA. The language of § 4(f)(2) covers only newly hired employees. In addition, the stated
purpose is not only to "promote employment of older persons" but also "to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). See generally Comment, Age Discrimination
in Private Pension Plans, 9 SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 67 (1981).
232 S. REP. No. 493, supra note 58, at 508. See also Hearings on S.830, Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (comments of Sen. Javits);
Note, The Cost Defense Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 1982 DuKE L. J. 580, 589
(surveying legislative history of § 4(f)(2)); Note, supra note 208.
233 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1) (1987). The EEOC unfortunately has been slow to help courts and
litigants ascertain the scope of§ 4(f)(2) protection and the role of early retirement under the ADEA.
The EEOC failed to issue any new guidelines on § 4(f)(2) for several years, relying instead on
Department of Labor interpretations. 44 Fed. Reg. 30658 (1979), as amended at 52 Fed. Reg. 8448
(1987), redesignated and amended at 52 Fed. Reg. 23812 (1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10
(1987)). Under the regulations, the employer is not required to spend more to give an older
employee the same benefits as a younger employee. 29 C.F.R. 1625.10(a)(1) (1987). The employer,
however, is required to spend the same amount of money on older employees as on younger. Id.
Under the interpretations, an employer may reduce benefits to an older worker because of cost
only after communicating the reduction to the employees. Id. Two methods may be used: (1) a
"benefit-by-benefit" approach in which reductions must be justified based on the cost of each benefit,
and (2) a "benefit package" approach in which benefits may be lumped together so that a greater
reduction may be made in one benefit in order to provide enhanced benefits that might otherwise
be cut. Id.
2 See supra note 27.
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leave courts open to consider new and creative ways in which employers might achieve
arbitrary age discrimination. Several distinct characteristics of retirement incentives have
sufficient indicia of nonarbitrariness that their use should not be deemed a subterfuge
to evade the ADEA. As a preliminary matter, the defendant is always able to rebut the
plaintiff's claim by demonstrating that the unequal benefit distribution is not caused by
age. If the unequal benefit distribution is caused by age, the defendant should be able
to demonstrate that the age-triggered benefit is not a subterfuge if it involves only a
minimum eligibility age. Similarly, age should not be a subterfuge if it is designed to
achieve equality of result. Finally, the defendant may be able to show significant, de-
monstrable cost considerations that justify structuring the benefits by age.
First, as a preliminary matter, the defendant may be able to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case by demonstrating that the unequal benefit distribution is not caused by
age. Incentives that give increased benefits to employees in proportion to the employee's
years of service reward longer service and can appropriately be viewed as a benefit given
by seniority or as a reasonable factor other than age and therefore not a subterfuge to
evade the ADEA. 35 Similarly, tying enhanced incentives to salary also would be a rea-
sonable factor other than age for structuring the incentive.236 There may be a disparate
impact due to age, but this disparate impact does not support an 'inference of age
discrimination.
Second, the defendant should be able to demonstrate a section 4(f)(2) defense by
establishing that the retirement incentive sets a minimum eligibility age for benefits.
Setting a minimum eligibility age is the most common age distinction in retirement plans
and retirement incentives. In light of both the nature of the harm caused by minimum
eligibility ages and the practical necessity for setting minimum ages, courts should not
deem a minimum eligibility age as a subterfuge under the ADEA.
Minimum eligibility ages are not the kind of invidious age distinction that caused
Congress to pass the ADEA.237 Rather, minimum eligibility ages allow employers to show
a preference for older employees by making age-triggered rewards available to them.238
It is an age-based distinction within the protected class, but the younger, excluded
employees will eventually reach the age where they too may be given age-triggered
benefits. 23 9 Although it does not achieve an age blind goal of having employees judged
solely on ability, this age distinction does allow employers to acknowledge that older
employees within the protected class indeed have some interests, particularly retirement,
distinct from younger employees.
Minimum eligibility ages are also consistent with Social Security and ERISA, both
of which allow minimum ages for benefits. 240 Since Congress actively sought to reconcile
ERISA with the ADEA in the 1978 ADEA amendments, it is only reasonable to conclude
that Congress intended that minimum eligibility ages are not a subterfuge to evade the
235 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
26Id. See also Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988) (no
discrimination in severance retirement incentive where bonus was tied to salary).
237 See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988) (ADEA does
not protect younger against older in early retirement plans); Dorsch v. L. B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d
1421, 1427 (7th Cir. 1986).
2S9 Wehrley v. American Motors Sales Corp., No. F86-248 (N.S. In. Feb. 12, 1988) (available
March 20, 1988, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
240 See supra notes 93 and 209.
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ADEA.241 Minimum eligibility ages may also be justified by practical considerations.
Making all employees over 40 eligible for retirement incentives would be prohibitively
costly and might seriously disrupt a business. For all these reasons, it should be facially
reasonable, and therefore protected under section 4(f)(2), for employers to set a mini-
mum eligibility age for retirement incentives.
Defendants also can demonstrate that a plan is not arbitrary, and consequently not
a subterfuge to evade the ADEA, if the plan provides unequal benefit distribution in
order to achieve equality of result.242 For example, suppose a plan offers variable incen-
tives to all employees over age 55 in a manner that gives employees the same monthly
benefits, or some percent of the benefits, that they could obtain at full eligibility for their
pension. In this example, the plan is tailored to treat each employee as if he or she were
at whatever age triggers full benefits. In this form of plan the employer treats employees
differently because of their age, but the differing treatment is designed to allow all
employees to reach the same end position of maximum monthly benefits and thus should
not violate the ADEA. Plans structured in this way do not deny benefits to older em-
ployees that younger employees will receive. Rather, plans structured in this way give
younger employees the same benefits, or some percent of the benefits, received by the
older employees.
Several analogous situations help illustrate this point. Employers do not unlawfully
discriminate when they give all employees the same insurance coverage, even though
the cost is higher for older employees. Similarly, employers do not discriminate when
they offer to pay for education for employees. Employees who have less education to
begin with receive a greater benefit, but the program can be justified on the ground that
it seeks to place all employees at the same finishing spot. If, in contrast, an employer
offered educational benefits only to employees under the age of 50, the excluded
employees have a valid age discrimination claim. In that case older employees cannot
achieve the same goal of education as younger employees. Similarly, if an incentive plan
offered cash bonuses only to employees age 65 to 70, but denied them to older employees,
the older employees are being denied a benefit younger employees receive. 21s Absent an
independent justification for structuring the incentive in this manner, section 4(f)(2)
should not apply.
Finally, the employer should be able to satisfy section 4(f)(2) by demonstrating
significant and readily demonstrable business or cost considerations that justify structur-
ing the benefits to reduce or deny benefits to older employees. Pure cash incentives that
241 See supra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
242 See e.g., Dorsch v. L. B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986); Potenze v. New York
Shipping Association, Inc., 804 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1955 (1987). Polenze
is not a completely analogous situation since the underlying benefits were given to guarantee a
steady income to workers in a depressed industry. In Potenze the Second Circuit held that an
employer who offset benefits by Social Security income for employees 65 and over but not for
employees 62-65 did not discriminate on the basis of age.
243 Contra Patterson v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984). A similar
problem has occurred in several instances in which employers deny severance benefits to employees
eligible for pension benefits. Severance benefits serve to mitigate the impact of a layoff and serve
a distinct purpose from retirement benefits. If employers do not consider alternative income in
granting younger employees severance benefits, they should not consider alternative income for
older employees. See, e.g., EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1391-93 (9th Cir. 1984); EEOC
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
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give older employees fewer benefits and are not designed to supplement the underlying
pension, or are not tied to any external factors other than age, are the most difficult to
justify under the ADEA. Ironically, however, it is easier to articulate a generic cost
justification for lower incentives for older workers than for enhanced incentives for such
workers.244 For example, suppose that during a business slump an employer must ter-
minate ten employees over a two-year period. The employer may decide to offer retire-
ment incentives rather than simply terminate employees. If an employer wishes to "buy
out" an employee's right to continued employment, the value of the employee's right
decreases as the employee grows older. This value of the employee's right to continued
employment without regard to age was readily determined before Congress eliminated
the ADEA's upper age limit. For example, a 65 year old employee had five years of
continued employment left prior to mandatory retirement, while a 69 year old employee
had only one year of continued employment. If the employer's goal was to reduce the
workforce, the total cost to the employer of retaining the younger employee was greater
than the cost of keeping the older employee.2 4s Utilizing cost justification, the employer
probably would want the 65 year old employee to accept the retirement incentives. The
69 year old could be forced to leave in one year anyway, so the pay-off value is less.
Viewed as the purchase and sale of one-year units of labor, the value of the employee
nearer retirement is less than the value of an employee further from retirement.2 6
A similar, but less direct, generic cost justification for age-based incentives can be
made even without an upper cap on the protected class. Each year an employee continues
to work past age 65, the more likely health factors will cause the employee's retirement.
Consequently, the probability that an employee will elect to retire increases as the
employee ages. When offering a plan to a large group of employees, such factors may
affect the employer's decision concerning what age groups will be offered retirement
incentives.
An incentive plan that excludes older employees solely because of their age may be
economically efficient, but should not be cost justified under section 4(f)(2).247 Although
244 Cf Gipriano v. Board of Educ., N. Tonawanda, 785 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1986). The
Cipriano court reasoned:
Significant cost considerations are often involved ... in designing incentives for older
employees voluntarily to leave the workforce because those who continue working
beyond a certain age will often draw a salary that is significantly higher than the
periodic payments obtainable under a pension plan. Since the employer's goal in
offering early retirement incentives is often to save expenses by reducing the size of
the workforce, it is only reasonable for the employer to offer more to those employees
who choose to leave at a younger age, saving the employer more years of continued
full salary, than to those who remain in the workforce and do not confer on the
employer the sought-after benefit.
Id.
245 This example presupposes that there are no non-age based reasons to terminate the em-
ployment.
246 Experience is a significant quality factor that may affect how employees perform and con-
sequently might give a higher per-year value to the work of the more experienced, and probably
older, worker. This example presumes, however, that there is no difference in the quality of the
work performed between the 65 year old and the 69 year old.
247 In other words, cost justification under § 4(f)(2) should not be interpreted to allow any
economically efficient result as defined by current legal scholars. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 312-15 (1986). Rather, "cost justification" is a term designed to draw on cost
factors to distinguish between lawful and unlawful conduct. Consequently, even if an incentive plan
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an employer can point to a cost justification in such a situation, it is not a finely tailored
plan designed to eliminate a direct out-of-pocket expenbe.2 48 An analogy to Los Angeles
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart helps explain this distinction.2 49 In Manhart, the
Supreme Court found that an employer's practice of requiring female employees to
contribute 15 percent more to the pension plan than male employees, even though the
monthly benefits were identical for men and women, violated Title VII. The rate dis-
tinction was based solely on gender.2 50 The Court rejected cost justification, finding that
no such defense was available to the employer under Title VII.251 The Manhart Court's
rationale, however, goes beyond simply rejecting a cost justification. The Court reasoned
that Title VII requires that the employer treat its employees as individuals and not as
components of a group.2 52 Statistical differences do not indicate whether any particular
female employee will live longer than any particular male employee. Statistics only
provide predictive cost justification for entire groups.2 53
When viewed in isolation, all differential benefits can be cost justified simply by
taking into account the employee's expected work life and considering the employee as
a member of a group. Yet such indirect monetary benefits are more speculative than
direct out-of-pocket expenses. The employer may or may not realize an economic ben-
efit.254 To allow these more speculative benefits to be a valid cost justification under
section 4(f)(2) creates an exception that swallows the rule. The only way courts can
monitor effectively the section 4(f)(2) defense is to require specific articulation of readily
identifiable cost savings.2 55 Courts should not interpret statutes to create purported
limiting concepts if the limiting concepts are not justiciable. Rather, courts need to
interpret statutes in a way that allows them to exercise judicial review over employer
conduct. Economic sleights of hand and generic assumptions are elusive and very difficult
to review judicially. The burden should be on the employer seeking a section 4(f)(2)
defense to present the court with a concrete, demonstrable cost justification for struc-
turing age based benefits that are not justified by minimum eligibility age or equality of
results.
that excluded the older employees solely because of their age were economically efficient, that does
not render it presumptively cost justified under section 4(f)(2).
248 See Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1988) (an employer "had
better be able to prove a close correlation between age and cost if he wants to shelter in the safe
harbor of section 4(f)(2)"). An employer's refusal to hire workers over 30 can be cost-justified based
on the training cost compared to the employee's anticipated work life.
249 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
z29 Id. at 705.
25 1 Id. at 716-17.
25 2 Id. at 708 ("the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on fairness to the individuals
rather than fairness to classes").
253 See also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(1) (1987).
25 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708. Under an economic analysis, if the benefit to the employer is less
speculative, employer will place a high value on it. Consequently, because the employer is less sure
of the the employee retiring at age 70, or 72, or 75, the employer in theory is more likely to increase
the incentive.
25 See supra note 248. If an employer wished to limit the incentives' cost to $10,000 for each
employee, for example, the employer could give a five year extension on health benefits (figuring
the cost per employee) and provide the balance in cash. Under most health insurance policies this
would result in older employees receiving less of a lump sum payment because the cost of the
insurance would be higher. The total cost per employee would be the same, however, so the incentive
program would be cost justified.
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Consistent with the McMann Court's definition of subterfuge, all inquires concerning
subterfuge should be examined in light of the employer's intent. For example, suppose
the employer's goal is to encourage all employees to retire by age 65, and in order to
achieve this goal the employer gives reduced benefits to employees over age 65 so that
employees under age 65 will see the advantage of retiring before their benefits are (or
might be) lowered. In this example, a court should carefully scrutinize the employer's
justification for giving fewer benefits to older employees to be sure that it is finely
tailored to achieve the employer's lawful goals, such as readily demonstrable cost sav-
ings.256 If the employer has both an independent justification for giving older employees
fewer benefits, such as readily demonstrable cost savings, and a goal of treating older
employees adversely, then the employer has a dual motive. If the employer demonstrates
that the retirement incentive would have been offered in the manner that it was even if
there had been no improper motive, then age discriminatory intent is not the cause of
the harm.2 s7 If, on the other hand, the employer fails to show that the independent
justification would have resulted in the plan being structured as it was, then the logical
inference is that the discriminatory goal was the determinative factor in the plan's
structure. In that case the plan is a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the ADEA.
Interpreting section 4(f)(2) involves construing an exception to a non-discrimination
statute, and traditionally such exceptions should be strictly construed.258 In addition, the
burden of proving that the exception applies rests with the defendant25 9 Defendants
face the task of proving a negative with section 4(f)(2); a defendant must show that the
plan was not arbitrary and that it was not a subterfuge to evade the ADEA. Through
the methods noted above, defendants should be able to satisfy this burden by demon-
strating an independent justification for structuring the plan in the manner that it was
done.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to enhance the options
available to older workers. Both eliminating involuntary retirement and allowing em-
ployers to offer employees early retirement incentives further the ADEA's goals of
increasing the range of options available to employees. Consequently, employees included
in a retirement incentive offer are not discriminated against because the employer's offer
has broadened their range of choices. The incentive offer becomes illusory, however, if
the employer interferes with the employee's choice by making the incentive appear more
attractive than it actually is or by making the alternative of remaining employed unpal-
atable. If the employer acts to skew the employee's choice, the employer has interfered.
with the voluntariness of the retirement incentive and has violated theADEA.
Employees who are excluded from a retirement incentive or who receive lower
benefits solely because of their age have been "discriminated against." To escape liability,
2
-
6 See Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F. 2d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 1988).
257 Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1979); Mt. Healthy City
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
28 EEOC v. Maine, 644 F. Supp. 223, 226 (D. Me. 1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1) ("[the
exception [of § 4(f)(2)] must be narrowly construed").259 See Cipriano v. Board of Educ. N. Tonawanda, 785 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1986); EEOC v.
Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d
211, 223 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 92 (1984).
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the employer must show that the offered retirement incentives are bona fide and not a
subterfuge to evade the ADEA's purposes in order to fall within the section 4(f)(2)
exception. Employers have met these requirements if the incentives merely set a mini-
mum eligibility age or when employees are given equality of results. Employers can also
satisfy section 4(f)(2) if they demonstrate a specific, immediate cost justification. In this
way, the employer may not arbitrarily deny incentives to older employees because of
their age, the very conduct sought to be eliminated under the ADEA.
